asan-kaygy
Цензор
Хондемира и Таварихи Гузидайи Нусрат-наме перевели бы лучше.
Чингизиды
- Автор темы gotard
- Дата начала
asan-kaygy
Цензор
А вот Кырыми и нового Утемыш-хаджи жду.
Dark_Ambient
Римский гражданин
хотелось бы конечно
может быть когда-нибудь граждане из Казани договорятся с гражданами из Узбекистана, и будут нормальные издания
а со Стамбульской рукописью Чингиз-наме никаких подвижек нет?
хорошо бы вот достать книгу Валиди Тогана История башкир, изданную в 2010-м
может быть когда-нибудь граждане из Казани договорятся с гражданами из Узбекистана, и будут нормальные издания
а со Стамбульской рукописью Чингиз-наме никаких подвижек нет?
хорошо бы вот достать книгу Валиди Тогана История башкир, изданную в 2010-м
asan-kaygy
Цензор
Со стамбульской есть, но
1. Трудности с переводом
2. данных новых там не так уж и много, точнее мало.
Меня лично интересуют тюркские источники по истории Золотой Орды и татарских ханств. Думаю издание этих источников имело бы не меньшее значение для истории чем тюркские рунические надписи для изучения истории древних тюрков. Я за издание как хроник, так и материалов эпической традиции (шеджере, исторические песни и т.д.).
У Романа Храпачевского была идея издать пять томов источников. Арабские, персидские, монгольские и китайские уже изданы в первом и третьем томе. Относительно известий армянских источников о монголах, то были изданы разные книги, но их сведения не были сведены в единое целое. Вардан Аревелци, Григор Акнерци, Киракос Гандзакеци, издавались отдельно от других армянских источников, которые издал в 1962 году А.Г. Галстян. Еще было бы неплохо увидеть в этом томе и сведения Картлис Цховреба (собрания грузинских исторических хроник).
Относительно сведений русских и латинских источников, то самих источников очень много. Для сведений одних только русских летописей наверное понадобиться немаленьких размеров книжка. То же самое скажу и относительно европейских источников.
Относительно византийских источников, то их материалов конечно будет меньше, но пока никто не издал собрание их известий о монголах и Золотой Орде.
В общем, для издания есть много разных материалов.
У Романа Храпачевского была идея издать пять томов источников. Арабские, персидские, монгольские и китайские уже изданы в первом и третьем томе. Относительно известий армянских источников о монголах, то были изданы разные книги, но их сведения не были сведены в единое целое. Вардан Аревелци, Григор Акнерци, Киракос Гандзакеци, издавались отдельно от других армянских источников, которые издал в 1962 году А.Г. Галстян. Еще было бы неплохо увидеть в этом томе и сведения Картлис Цховреба (собрания грузинских исторических хроник).
Относительно сведений русских и латинских источников, то самих источников очень много. Для сведений одних только русских летописей наверное понадобиться немаленьких размеров книжка. То же самое скажу и относительно европейских источников.
Относительно византийских источников, то их материалов конечно будет меньше, но пока никто не издал собрание их известий о монголах и Золотой Орде.
В общем, для издания есть много разных материалов.
Dark_Ambient
Римский гражданин
Византийские источники я сейчас и сам разыскиваю, вообще в последнее время по примеру Романа Храпачевского собираю любые крохи по ЗО
Вы какие именню тюркские источники имеете в виду?
Вы какие именню тюркские источники имеете в виду?
Хотелось бы увидеть издание хроник Крымского Ханства, поволжских татарских, турецких источников, шейбанидских хроник, материалов татарских, башкирских, казахских шеджере, ногайских исторических песен. Также хотел бы увидеть отображение золотоордынской эпохи в материалах эпоса тюркских народов.
asan-kaygy
Цензор
Не входило в число его первых приоритетов, Тангут был как заноза, а до индии ехать долго было.
Насчет больших расстояний.Разве они когда то пугали кочевников?В ноябре 1221г. Потрясатель стоял на границах Индии с главными своими силами.Его авангардные тумены во главе с Бала и Дурбаем провели военную разведку территорий Делийского султаната.Однако Чингисхан не перешел Инд и не захватил страну "царя слонов".Мнение Доманина,что монголов напугало многолюдство Индостана,не кажется серьезным аргументом.В Китае людей проживало еще больше,но это монгольского кагана не остановило,когда он начал войну с чжурчженями.Известно,что он очень не желал военного столкновения с державой хорезмшахов.Война с Хорезмом,по многим обстоятельствам,была для монгола вынужденной.Когда же Чингисхан собирался выполнять волю Тенгри по обьединению мира под своей властью?Ведь жизнь его подходила к концу. Интересно, когда откровение с Неба снизошло на кагана?В 1206 г.? Или?
Тут важным фактором был климат. Степные лошади быстро умирали в непривычном климате. Также были часты смерти людей в тропическом климате. Другая вода, другая экология, другие болезни. С Индией была почти такая же ситуация, что и с Вьетнамом. Монголы могли совершать походы в долину реки Инд, Кашмир и район Дели. Дальше они не рисковали заходить. И Делийский султанат и Империя Великих Монголов имела центром Дели поскольку местный климат был менее губительным для тюркских завоевателей чем тот, что в центре и на юге. Но даже Бабур жаловался на то, что пришлось из привычной Средней Азии бежать в Индию. Горы Кашмира и пустыня Раджахстана были более привычными для кочевников чем тропические леса. Поэтому экспедиции монголов в такие южные земли осуществоялся силами союзников и подданых более привычных к местному климату. Надолго монголы также не задерживались в таких странах как Бирма (Паган), Вьетнам, Чьямпа (Южный Вьетнам), Ява. Несколько в стороне от этих стран стоит Южный Китай, который монголам было просто необходимо завоевать и удержать. Операция была осуществлена силами монголов и их союзников и подданых.
asan-kaygy
Цензор
Купил насировы таблицы на английском там много указано про военачальников в газне, кашмире от Даира и Мангутая до Сали.
??апов А.В. Никудерийская орда как фактор чагатайской истории (1270-1330-е гг.)
http://www.hamagmongol.narod.ru/index_r.htm
??апов А.В. Проблема правления султана Халила и Казан-хана в реконструкции чагатайской истории 30-40-х гг. XIV в.
http://www.hamagmongol.narod.ru/index_r.htm
http://www.hamagmongol.narod.ru/index_r.htm
??апов А.В. Проблема правления султана Халила и Казан-хана в реконструкции чагатайской истории 30-40-х гг. XIV в.
http://www.hamagmongol.narod.ru/index_r.htm
MONGOL ARMIES AND INDIAN CAMPAIGNS by John Masson Smith, Jr. University of California, Berkeley
http://www.mongolianculture.com/MONGOL-ARMIES.htm
Abstract
The Mongol campaigns into Northwestern India were decisively shaped by the region’s climate. The nomads who supplied the manpower and logistic support for the Mongol cavalry armies depended on pastoral animals adapted to cold and temperate conditions adjusted by migration in Inner Asia. Northwestern India provided suitable conditions in winter, but not in summer. Juvaini remarks on the withdrawal of Chinggis Khan’s Punjab garrison as the summer heat set in, and Ibn Battuta discusses the high mortality of steppe horses exported by the Golden Horde to India. The Mongols could campaign in India only in winter.
Because of this constraint on sustained operations, the purposes of the Mongol invasions appear to have been limited. The attacks at least yielded booty, and the accompanying devastation of the frontier zone kept Delhi’s forces away from Mongol Afghanistan. They may also have enabled use of the frontier lowlands by the Mongol nomads as winter pastures, qishlaqs. Finally, the Mongols probably hoped that enough pressure would compel the Delhi Sultanate, like the Seljuk Sultanate and Armenian Kingdom in the Middle East, to accept vassal status.
But the force applied by the Mongols was insufficient to cow the Delhi Sultanate. The sources claim invasions by hundreds of thousands of Mongols, numbers approximating (and probably based on) the size of the entire cavalry armies of the Mongol realms of Central Asia or the Middle East: about 150,000 men. A count of the Mongol commanders named in the sources as participating in the various invasions might give a better indication of the numbers involves, as these commanders probably led tumens, units nominally of 10,000 men. The small numbers of named commanders mentioned in J. L. Mehta’s work, and the fact that most of these were only generals, not the rulers of the adjacent Mongol realms, seems to suggest that the attacks involved at most a few tens of thousands.
The climatic constraint on sustained operations explains the Mongols’ failure to consolidate their occasional gains in India: Lahore, for instance was repeatedly taken and then abandoned. The hypothesis of small Mongol forces would account for their frequent defeats by the Delhi armies. The 30,000-man cavalry army of Balban (reg. 1266-86) would have been as large as, or larger than, most of the invading Mongol contingents. And finally, the Delhi cavalry was probably better mounted than the Mongols, probably better armed, and possibly better trained. The few horses to survive the climate of Delhi had to be carefully tended and well fed, and consequently could grow larger than the Mongols’ steppe-grazed ponies. And the cream of the Delhi army were slave-soldiers, whom we know from other cases (the mamluks of the Abbasids and of Egypt) could be trained to extraordinary skills with arms.
________________________________________________________
MONGOL ARMIES AND INDIAN CAMPAIGNS
John Masson Smith, Jr.
University of California, Berkeley
The Mongols’ attacks on India attempted to prepare for one part of their program of world-conquest. From the outset of their expansionist activities, they sent relatively small forces to frontier zones to reconnoiter and devastate adjacent powers to encourage submission or in preparation for a large-scale invasion. We see this pattern in the raids preliminary to the invasions of northern China, and in the small-scale war kept up in northern China while the main Mongol army conquered Central Asia-—and came, briefly, to India. We see it from ca. 1230 until the coming of Hulegu in the Middle East, where three or four Mongol tumens, military units nominally of 10,000 men each, established themselves on the fine pastures of Azerbaijan and thence campaigned into surrounding regions, obtaining the submission of the overawed Cilician Armenians and the defeated Anatolian Seljuqs, and harassing the Caliphate in Iraq.
The Mongols likewise established a military presence on the northwestern frontier of India, and intermittently applied some military pressure on the adjacent Indian powers, primarily the Sultanate of Delhi. They conducted something like 14 incursions between 1221 and 1326. But no large-scale invasion was undertaken—for reasons I shall suggest in a moment. And as time passed without a follow-up to these attacks, the local Mongol strategy seems to have become less a preparatory than a holding operation. The raids laid waste from time to time the region between Delhi and the Khyber Pass, preventing the establishment by Delhi of forward bases from which to threaten the Mongols in Afghanistan or on winter pastures in the “grass scrub and steppe” below the frontier ranges; the raiders who were not defeated by the Sultanate’s forces, as happened with increasing frequency as time went on, also returned home with booty, which helped finance, and inspire enthusiasm for, the campaigns. But the Delhi sultans could not be overawed by the Mongols’ threats, and their armies could not be demolished by the Mongol assaults. Why should the Delhi Sultans have succeeded where the Caliph, the Khwarezmshah, and the Jin and Sung emperors failed? How did India escape the fate of Iran and Iraq, Russia and China?
Three texts, it seems to me, nicely suggest the obstacles that prevented the Mongols from campaigning effectively in—much less conquering—India. The first, from the Persian historian, Juvaini, reads as follows (in J.A. Boyle’s translation):
[After the battle, 1221, by the Indus River,]
[w]hen Chaghatai returned without having
found the Sultan [Jalaluddin b. Muhammad
Khwarezmshah], Chingiz-Khan deputed Torbei
Toqshin, together with two tumen of Mongol troops,
to cross the Indus in his pursuit.
Torbei Toqshin advanced ….. [and] took
the fortress of Nandana [in Jhelum District, Punjab]
and wrought great slaughter. Then he turned against
Multan …. [T]he town was on the point of surrendering.
However, the great heat of the climate prevented his
remaining longer; so having plundered and massacred
throughout the province of Multan and Lahore, he
returned from thence and recrossed the Indus; and
arriving in Ghazna followed in the wake of Chingiz-
Khan [who was returning via Afghanistan and Central
Asia to Mongolia].[1]
Climate created the main impediment to Mongol campaigning in India. The Mongols’ livestock-raising economy depended on climatic—especially temperature--adjustments through nomadism to maintain the health and productivity of the animals, and the Mongol army, reliant on its horses, similarly depended on seasonally-adapted campaigning. The Central Asian campaign of which the first incursion into India was a part exemplifies this adaptation: the army operated in cooler highland regions in summer, and in warmer lowland desert and semi-desert terrain in winter. The Mongol wars with the Egyptian Mamluks over Syria exhibited the same procedure.[2] The extreme heat of summer constituted the Mongols’ problem in India, as the quotation from Juvaini indicates. Their incursions seem to have been brief, even when not defeated by the forces of Delhi, and to have taken place in winter, because only then was it cool enough for the comfort of the Mongols’ horses (as, by the way, for modern tourists from temperate regions). The average temperature in the zone including Lahore and Delhi is 65-70 degrees F in November, and drops gradually to 60-65 at Delhi and below 60 at Lahore by February; thereafter it rises by May to over 90 degrees F. The Mongols did not want to jeopardize their horses’ health—and their own safety—by exposing them to this debilitating heat (you New Yorkers will recall that the carriage-horses in Central Park must not work when the temperature goes over __________).
The second suggestive text comes from the work of the Muslim traveller, Ibn Batuta:
Horses are exported [from the Golden
Horde] to India (in droves), each one numbering six
thousand or more or less …. When they reach the
land of Sind with their horses, they feed them with
forage, because the vegetation of the land of Sind
does not take the place of barley, and the greater part
of the horses die or are stolen.[3]
The basic Mongol force was an all-cavalry, high-horsepower army. The normal requirement of horses was five per soldier, although higher numbers, perhaps reached by counting animals brought along for food together with the military mounts. The ration requirements of these animals were enormous. Although the individual horses—which were only ponies, weighing perhaps 600 lbs (cf ordinary modern horses at about 1000 lbs)—needed only about 10 lbs of hay or the equivalent, and some 5 (U.S.) gallons of water, the collective daily equine demands of the (nominal) 50,000 horses of a Mongol tumen (nominally) of 10,000 men, amounted to 250 tons of hay-equivalent and 250,000 gallons of water. Mongol armies entering India could count on obtaining enough water from the Indus and its affluents, but the sufficiency of grazing, judging by Ibn Batuta’s remark—“the vegetation of the land of Sind does not take the place of barley”—seems to have been problematic (although the grazing in the zone of “semi-desert grasses and shrubs” arcing from the Khybar Pass to Lahore and Delhi, and turning, to Jaipur and Kathiawar, may have been adequate in season. I do no have information about the productivity of these semi-desert grasslands, but pastures with similar description in Central Asia produce 500 kg/ha (or 445 lbs/acre),[4] which means that a Mongol tumen would have needed access to around 1124 acres—1.75 sq. mi.--a day to obtain 10 lbs of (dry) grass for each of its 50,000 ponies. This does not seem an impossible requirement, until the tumen attempts to halt for a time, to conduct a siege, for instance. Collecting and transporting fodder for a tumen’s horses instead of grazing them, as Ibn Batuta says was done for imported horses, would have been difficult. The nutritional equivalent of grass in barley and straw, at 5 lbs of barley and 5 more of straw, is also 250 tons, meaning 1250 camel-loads of 400 lbs each, and enough barley modestly to feed 83,000 humans.
Before proceeding to the third text, some discussion of the sizes of the Mongol forces that attacked India is necessary. The sources—as far as I can tell from the secondary literature—tend to claim immense numbers in the Mongol invading forces. The armies of 10, 15 and 20 tumens must correspond, not to any actual campaigning force, but to the total (nominal) strength of the Chaghataid realm. The armies of the regional khanates seem each to have numbered 15 to 17 tumens, a size-limit probably set so as not to exceed the army of Mongolia proper.[5] The Chaghataids could have counted more after some tumens in Afghanistan shifted allegiance to them from the Ilkhans; but they would not have brought them all to India, leaving their homeland open to their Ilkhanid and Qubilaid enemies.[1] (Note that 20 tumens is 200,000 men, more than the entire manpower of Mongolia, plus a million horses!) Prisoners under interrogation may have given these figures to daunt their enemies, as Ket-Buqa, the Mongol commander at ‘Ayn Jalut allegedly did to his Mamluk captors, and the Delhi officers, to magnify their successes, may have accepted them.
Most of the identifiable expedition leaders—Tayir of the 1241-42 incursion, Sali in 1246-47 and 1257-58, Abdullah in 1292, and Qutluq Khwaja in 1299-1300—seem to have been only tumen commanders based on or near the frontier. Tayir was connected with Badghis, a yaylaq, summer-pasture, along with Juvain, complementing the qishlaq, winter-pastures, of Herat.[6] Sali’s unit was based on Baghlan (yaylaq) and Qunduz (qishlaq).[7] Abdullah was the son of Mochi (b. Baiju b. Chaghatai), commander of the “cherig of Qarauna” in the Ghazni region.[8] And Qutluq Khwaja (b. Du’a) likewise—presumably in replacement of Abdullah—commanded the Qaraunas of Ghazni, who “have constantly to do battle with the Sultan of Delhi.”[9] The accounts of some campaigns mention the involvement of more than one Mongol commander, each presumably the leader of a tumen. Tayir, “and other noyans [generals]” campaigned in 1241-42.[10] Two, “Targhi” as well as Qutluq Khwaja, participated in 1299-1300, and three, “Targhi” again, “Tartaq” (or “Tash,”) and “Ali Beg,” in 1305. Only three commanders seem to have been in positions to mobilize larger armies. Monggetei, commanding a corps of two tumens (or perhaps three: his own, and those of Atsiz and Qaracha, with whom he campaigned in 1221),[11] “Kubak,” who may be Du’a’s generalissimo, the Suldus, Kobek,;and the Chaghataid ruler, Tarmashirin, and even Tarmashirin seems to have led only four tumens, apparently the largest force on record (unless the names of other commanders have been omitted in the primary or secondary sources). Although the regular Mongol units were doubtless accompanied by volunteer irregulars and conscript “arrow-fodder” who enhanced the size if not the quality of the armies, the attacks on India were never delivered in overwhelming force.
With the invading Mongol forces cut down to size, we are ready for the third quotation, another from Ibn Batuta:
… [T]here remains a handsome profit for the traders
in these horses [from the Golden Horde], for they
sell the cheapest of them in the land of India for a
hundred silver dinars … and often for … twice or
three times as much. The good horses are worth five
hundred dinars or more. The people of India do not
buy them for running or racing, because they them-
selves wear coats of mail in battle and they cover their
horses with armour, and what they prize in these horses
is strength and length of pace.[12]
This passage points to another reason why the Mongols could not cope with the Sultanate of Delhi: the Delhi troops were better equipped. At the outset of their expansionist activity, the Mongol cavalry relied on hit-and-run archery tactics, envelopment and ambush; hand-to-hand fighting was avoided, since only the wealthy could afford armor and sophisticated shock weaponry (all soldiers were expected to carry an axe or club) and the Mongols’ ponies could not very effectively bear heavily-armed riders. As long as the Mongol cavalry could achieve superior numbers and mobility on the battlefield, as they did during their campaigns in North China and Central Asia, Russia and Hungary, these tactics and weapons sufficed. But in some places the Mongols could not bring their superior numbers to bear. In Syria, for instance, summer water-shortages precluded establishment of a large army of occupation: only one tumen seems to have been sustainable, and the Egyptian Mamluks could field as many, and as time went on, more troops. And these troops were better equipped (and, as we shall see, better trained). They wore armor, carried lances and swords in addition to bows and arrows, and rode fodder-fed horses that were bigger than the Mongols’ grazed ponies. They won most of their battles with the Mongols, and won the war.
The conditions and outcome of the Mongol attacks on India were similar. The inadequacy of grazing and hazard of high temperatures in India already discussed limited the numbers and staying power of the Mongol invaders. The Mongols do not seem to have used more than four tumens in any incursion, and usually rather fewer, and the Delhi Sultanate soon managed to match these numbers. Sultan Balaban (1266-86) maintained 30,000 cavalry at Delhi, in addition to other troops in other parts of the Sultanate, forces sufficient to met the Mongols in equal if not superior numbers. Moreover, as Ibn Batuta tells us, the Delhi cavalry was heavy cavalry, armored (men and horses both) and armed for either missile or shock combat, riding grain-fed horses larger than the Mongol ponies.
Finally, the Delhi cavalrymen may have been better soldiers than the Mongols. Some of the elite troops of the Delhi Sultanate, like the sultans themselves who emerged from this elite, were of slave origin, and a—perhaps the—purpose of recruiting slaves as soldiers was to create the conditions necessary for an extraordinary course in discipline and training. Anecdotal and archaeological information from the time of the ninth-century Abbasid dynasty, and later, training manuals of the Egyptian Mamluks and others reveal the methods that could produce the remarkable skills of slave-soldiers—mamluks. Let me give two useful examples of these skills. The Egyptian mamluks were expected, in normal practice, to be able to shoot three arrows in one and a half seconds; and to strike with the sword, while galloping, three times a second.[13] The slave-soldiers of Delhi may well have attained such skills, and the other, more numerous cavalrymen in the sultans’ service may have approximated them—at least to the point of outshooting the galloping Mongols. As Amir Khusrau put it, “Although each year the Mongols come from Khurasan … [they] yield up their ghosts wherever the Turks send the showers of their fatal arrows.”[14]
[1] ‘Ala al-Din Juvaini, The History of the World-Conqueror, J.A. Boyle trans. (Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 1958), I, 141-42.
[2] J.M. Smith, Jr., “ Ayn Jalut: Mamluk Success or Mongol Failure?” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 44:2 (1984). Idem, “Nomads on Ponies vs Slave on Horses,” review article on Reuven Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 1260-1281, forthcoming in the Journal of the American Oriental Society, 118:1.
[3] Ibn Batuta, The Travels of Ibn Battuta, H.A.R. Gibb trans. (Cambridge UK: Cambridge UP, 1962), II, 478.
[4] I.V. Larin, Pasture Rotation, 3rd ed. (Moscow: State Publishing House of Agricultural Literature), trans. Israel Program for Scientific Translations (Jerusalem, 1962), 144.
[5] J.M. Smith, Jr., “Mongol Manpower and Persian Population,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 18:3 (1975).
[6] Rashid al-Din, The Successors of Genghis Khan, J.A. Boyle trans. [RaD/B] (New York: Columbia UP, 1971), 52 and n. 197.
[7] J.A. Boyle, “The Mongol Commanders in Afghanistan and India According to the Tabaqat-I-Nasiri of Juzjani,” Islamic Studies, II (1963); reprinted in idem, The Mongol World Empire (London: Variorum, 1977), see ch. IX, p. 239.
[8] RaD/B, 144.
[9] RaD/B, 142.
[10] J.A. Boyle, “Mongol Commanders,” p. 240.
[11] Ibid., p. 242.
[12] Ibn Batuta, II, 479.
[13] On this archery, see Taybugha, Saracen Archery, J.D. Latham and W.F. Paterson ed. and trans. (London: Holland, 1970), 138 pt. vii, and 142, pt. 5; and Anon., Arab Archery, N.A. Faris and R.P. Elmer ed. and trans. (Princeton, 1945), 150-51. I have discussed the archery techniques of the Mongols and the Egyptian Mamluks, and their tactical implications, in “Mongol Society and Military in the Middle East: Antecedents and Adaptations,” in War and Society in the Eastern Mediterranean, 7th-15th Centuries, Y.Lev ed. (Leiden: Brill, 1997).
For the sword technique, see H. Rabie, “The Training of the Mamluk Faris,” War, Technology and Society in the Middle East, V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp eds. (London: Oxford UP, 1975), 162.
[14] A. Wink, Al-Hind: the Making of the Indo-Islamic World, II (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 207.
http://www.mongolianculture.com/MONGOL-ARMIES.htm
Abstract
The Mongol campaigns into Northwestern India were decisively shaped by the region’s climate. The nomads who supplied the manpower and logistic support for the Mongol cavalry armies depended on pastoral animals adapted to cold and temperate conditions adjusted by migration in Inner Asia. Northwestern India provided suitable conditions in winter, but not in summer. Juvaini remarks on the withdrawal of Chinggis Khan’s Punjab garrison as the summer heat set in, and Ibn Battuta discusses the high mortality of steppe horses exported by the Golden Horde to India. The Mongols could campaign in India only in winter.
Because of this constraint on sustained operations, the purposes of the Mongol invasions appear to have been limited. The attacks at least yielded booty, and the accompanying devastation of the frontier zone kept Delhi’s forces away from Mongol Afghanistan. They may also have enabled use of the frontier lowlands by the Mongol nomads as winter pastures, qishlaqs. Finally, the Mongols probably hoped that enough pressure would compel the Delhi Sultanate, like the Seljuk Sultanate and Armenian Kingdom in the Middle East, to accept vassal status.
But the force applied by the Mongols was insufficient to cow the Delhi Sultanate. The sources claim invasions by hundreds of thousands of Mongols, numbers approximating (and probably based on) the size of the entire cavalry armies of the Mongol realms of Central Asia or the Middle East: about 150,000 men. A count of the Mongol commanders named in the sources as participating in the various invasions might give a better indication of the numbers involves, as these commanders probably led tumens, units nominally of 10,000 men. The small numbers of named commanders mentioned in J. L. Mehta’s work, and the fact that most of these were only generals, not the rulers of the adjacent Mongol realms, seems to suggest that the attacks involved at most a few tens of thousands.
The climatic constraint on sustained operations explains the Mongols’ failure to consolidate their occasional gains in India: Lahore, for instance was repeatedly taken and then abandoned. The hypothesis of small Mongol forces would account for their frequent defeats by the Delhi armies. The 30,000-man cavalry army of Balban (reg. 1266-86) would have been as large as, or larger than, most of the invading Mongol contingents. And finally, the Delhi cavalry was probably better mounted than the Mongols, probably better armed, and possibly better trained. The few horses to survive the climate of Delhi had to be carefully tended and well fed, and consequently could grow larger than the Mongols’ steppe-grazed ponies. And the cream of the Delhi army were slave-soldiers, whom we know from other cases (the mamluks of the Abbasids and of Egypt) could be trained to extraordinary skills with arms.
________________________________________________________
MONGOL ARMIES AND INDIAN CAMPAIGNS
John Masson Smith, Jr.
University of California, Berkeley
The Mongols’ attacks on India attempted to prepare for one part of their program of world-conquest. From the outset of their expansionist activities, they sent relatively small forces to frontier zones to reconnoiter and devastate adjacent powers to encourage submission or in preparation for a large-scale invasion. We see this pattern in the raids preliminary to the invasions of northern China, and in the small-scale war kept up in northern China while the main Mongol army conquered Central Asia-—and came, briefly, to India. We see it from ca. 1230 until the coming of Hulegu in the Middle East, where three or four Mongol tumens, military units nominally of 10,000 men each, established themselves on the fine pastures of Azerbaijan and thence campaigned into surrounding regions, obtaining the submission of the overawed Cilician Armenians and the defeated Anatolian Seljuqs, and harassing the Caliphate in Iraq.
The Mongols likewise established a military presence on the northwestern frontier of India, and intermittently applied some military pressure on the adjacent Indian powers, primarily the Sultanate of Delhi. They conducted something like 14 incursions between 1221 and 1326. But no large-scale invasion was undertaken—for reasons I shall suggest in a moment. And as time passed without a follow-up to these attacks, the local Mongol strategy seems to have become less a preparatory than a holding operation. The raids laid waste from time to time the region between Delhi and the Khyber Pass, preventing the establishment by Delhi of forward bases from which to threaten the Mongols in Afghanistan or on winter pastures in the “grass scrub and steppe” below the frontier ranges; the raiders who were not defeated by the Sultanate’s forces, as happened with increasing frequency as time went on, also returned home with booty, which helped finance, and inspire enthusiasm for, the campaigns. But the Delhi sultans could not be overawed by the Mongols’ threats, and their armies could not be demolished by the Mongol assaults. Why should the Delhi Sultans have succeeded where the Caliph, the Khwarezmshah, and the Jin and Sung emperors failed? How did India escape the fate of Iran and Iraq, Russia and China?
Three texts, it seems to me, nicely suggest the obstacles that prevented the Mongols from campaigning effectively in—much less conquering—India. The first, from the Persian historian, Juvaini, reads as follows (in J.A. Boyle’s translation):
[After the battle, 1221, by the Indus River,]
[w]hen Chaghatai returned without having
found the Sultan [Jalaluddin b. Muhammad
Khwarezmshah], Chingiz-Khan deputed Torbei
Toqshin, together with two tumen of Mongol troops,
to cross the Indus in his pursuit.
Torbei Toqshin advanced ….. [and] took
the fortress of Nandana [in Jhelum District, Punjab]
and wrought great slaughter. Then he turned against
Multan …. [T]he town was on the point of surrendering.
However, the great heat of the climate prevented his
remaining longer; so having plundered and massacred
throughout the province of Multan and Lahore, he
returned from thence and recrossed the Indus; and
arriving in Ghazna followed in the wake of Chingiz-
Khan [who was returning via Afghanistan and Central
Asia to Mongolia].[1]
Climate created the main impediment to Mongol campaigning in India. The Mongols’ livestock-raising economy depended on climatic—especially temperature--adjustments through nomadism to maintain the health and productivity of the animals, and the Mongol army, reliant on its horses, similarly depended on seasonally-adapted campaigning. The Central Asian campaign of which the first incursion into India was a part exemplifies this adaptation: the army operated in cooler highland regions in summer, and in warmer lowland desert and semi-desert terrain in winter. The Mongol wars with the Egyptian Mamluks over Syria exhibited the same procedure.[2] The extreme heat of summer constituted the Mongols’ problem in India, as the quotation from Juvaini indicates. Their incursions seem to have been brief, even when not defeated by the forces of Delhi, and to have taken place in winter, because only then was it cool enough for the comfort of the Mongols’ horses (as, by the way, for modern tourists from temperate regions). The average temperature in the zone including Lahore and Delhi is 65-70 degrees F in November, and drops gradually to 60-65 at Delhi and below 60 at Lahore by February; thereafter it rises by May to over 90 degrees F. The Mongols did not want to jeopardize their horses’ health—and their own safety—by exposing them to this debilitating heat (you New Yorkers will recall that the carriage-horses in Central Park must not work when the temperature goes over __________).
The second suggestive text comes from the work of the Muslim traveller, Ibn Batuta:
Horses are exported [from the Golden
Horde] to India (in droves), each one numbering six
thousand or more or less …. When they reach the
land of Sind with their horses, they feed them with
forage, because the vegetation of the land of Sind
does not take the place of barley, and the greater part
of the horses die or are stolen.[3]
The basic Mongol force was an all-cavalry, high-horsepower army. The normal requirement of horses was five per soldier, although higher numbers, perhaps reached by counting animals brought along for food together with the military mounts. The ration requirements of these animals were enormous. Although the individual horses—which were only ponies, weighing perhaps 600 lbs (cf ordinary modern horses at about 1000 lbs)—needed only about 10 lbs of hay or the equivalent, and some 5 (U.S.) gallons of water, the collective daily equine demands of the (nominal) 50,000 horses of a Mongol tumen (nominally) of 10,000 men, amounted to 250 tons of hay-equivalent and 250,000 gallons of water. Mongol armies entering India could count on obtaining enough water from the Indus and its affluents, but the sufficiency of grazing, judging by Ibn Batuta’s remark—“the vegetation of the land of Sind does not take the place of barley”—seems to have been problematic (although the grazing in the zone of “semi-desert grasses and shrubs” arcing from the Khybar Pass to Lahore and Delhi, and turning, to Jaipur and Kathiawar, may have been adequate in season. I do no have information about the productivity of these semi-desert grasslands, but pastures with similar description in Central Asia produce 500 kg/ha (or 445 lbs/acre),[4] which means that a Mongol tumen would have needed access to around 1124 acres—1.75 sq. mi.--a day to obtain 10 lbs of (dry) grass for each of its 50,000 ponies. This does not seem an impossible requirement, until the tumen attempts to halt for a time, to conduct a siege, for instance. Collecting and transporting fodder for a tumen’s horses instead of grazing them, as Ibn Batuta says was done for imported horses, would have been difficult. The nutritional equivalent of grass in barley and straw, at 5 lbs of barley and 5 more of straw, is also 250 tons, meaning 1250 camel-loads of 400 lbs each, and enough barley modestly to feed 83,000 humans.
Before proceeding to the third text, some discussion of the sizes of the Mongol forces that attacked India is necessary. The sources—as far as I can tell from the secondary literature—tend to claim immense numbers in the Mongol invading forces. The armies of 10, 15 and 20 tumens must correspond, not to any actual campaigning force, but to the total (nominal) strength of the Chaghataid realm. The armies of the regional khanates seem each to have numbered 15 to 17 tumens, a size-limit probably set so as not to exceed the army of Mongolia proper.[5] The Chaghataids could have counted more after some tumens in Afghanistan shifted allegiance to them from the Ilkhans; but they would not have brought them all to India, leaving their homeland open to their Ilkhanid and Qubilaid enemies.[1] (Note that 20 tumens is 200,000 men, more than the entire manpower of Mongolia, plus a million horses!) Prisoners under interrogation may have given these figures to daunt their enemies, as Ket-Buqa, the Mongol commander at ‘Ayn Jalut allegedly did to his Mamluk captors, and the Delhi officers, to magnify their successes, may have accepted them.
Most of the identifiable expedition leaders—Tayir of the 1241-42 incursion, Sali in 1246-47 and 1257-58, Abdullah in 1292, and Qutluq Khwaja in 1299-1300—seem to have been only tumen commanders based on or near the frontier. Tayir was connected with Badghis, a yaylaq, summer-pasture, along with Juvain, complementing the qishlaq, winter-pastures, of Herat.[6] Sali’s unit was based on Baghlan (yaylaq) and Qunduz (qishlaq).[7] Abdullah was the son of Mochi (b. Baiju b. Chaghatai), commander of the “cherig of Qarauna” in the Ghazni region.[8] And Qutluq Khwaja (b. Du’a) likewise—presumably in replacement of Abdullah—commanded the Qaraunas of Ghazni, who “have constantly to do battle with the Sultan of Delhi.”[9] The accounts of some campaigns mention the involvement of more than one Mongol commander, each presumably the leader of a tumen. Tayir, “and other noyans [generals]” campaigned in 1241-42.[10] Two, “Targhi” as well as Qutluq Khwaja, participated in 1299-1300, and three, “Targhi” again, “Tartaq” (or “Tash,”) and “Ali Beg,” in 1305. Only three commanders seem to have been in positions to mobilize larger armies. Monggetei, commanding a corps of two tumens (or perhaps three: his own, and those of Atsiz and Qaracha, with whom he campaigned in 1221),[11] “Kubak,” who may be Du’a’s generalissimo, the Suldus, Kobek,;and the Chaghataid ruler, Tarmashirin, and even Tarmashirin seems to have led only four tumens, apparently the largest force on record (unless the names of other commanders have been omitted in the primary or secondary sources). Although the regular Mongol units were doubtless accompanied by volunteer irregulars and conscript “arrow-fodder” who enhanced the size if not the quality of the armies, the attacks on India were never delivered in overwhelming force.
With the invading Mongol forces cut down to size, we are ready for the third quotation, another from Ibn Batuta:
… [T]here remains a handsome profit for the traders
in these horses [from the Golden Horde], for they
sell the cheapest of them in the land of India for a
hundred silver dinars … and often for … twice or
three times as much. The good horses are worth five
hundred dinars or more. The people of India do not
buy them for running or racing, because they them-
selves wear coats of mail in battle and they cover their
horses with armour, and what they prize in these horses
is strength and length of pace.[12]
This passage points to another reason why the Mongols could not cope with the Sultanate of Delhi: the Delhi troops were better equipped. At the outset of their expansionist activity, the Mongol cavalry relied on hit-and-run archery tactics, envelopment and ambush; hand-to-hand fighting was avoided, since only the wealthy could afford armor and sophisticated shock weaponry (all soldiers were expected to carry an axe or club) and the Mongols’ ponies could not very effectively bear heavily-armed riders. As long as the Mongol cavalry could achieve superior numbers and mobility on the battlefield, as they did during their campaigns in North China and Central Asia, Russia and Hungary, these tactics and weapons sufficed. But in some places the Mongols could not bring their superior numbers to bear. In Syria, for instance, summer water-shortages precluded establishment of a large army of occupation: only one tumen seems to have been sustainable, and the Egyptian Mamluks could field as many, and as time went on, more troops. And these troops were better equipped (and, as we shall see, better trained). They wore armor, carried lances and swords in addition to bows and arrows, and rode fodder-fed horses that were bigger than the Mongols’ grazed ponies. They won most of their battles with the Mongols, and won the war.
The conditions and outcome of the Mongol attacks on India were similar. The inadequacy of grazing and hazard of high temperatures in India already discussed limited the numbers and staying power of the Mongol invaders. The Mongols do not seem to have used more than four tumens in any incursion, and usually rather fewer, and the Delhi Sultanate soon managed to match these numbers. Sultan Balaban (1266-86) maintained 30,000 cavalry at Delhi, in addition to other troops in other parts of the Sultanate, forces sufficient to met the Mongols in equal if not superior numbers. Moreover, as Ibn Batuta tells us, the Delhi cavalry was heavy cavalry, armored (men and horses both) and armed for either missile or shock combat, riding grain-fed horses larger than the Mongol ponies.
Finally, the Delhi cavalrymen may have been better soldiers than the Mongols. Some of the elite troops of the Delhi Sultanate, like the sultans themselves who emerged from this elite, were of slave origin, and a—perhaps the—purpose of recruiting slaves as soldiers was to create the conditions necessary for an extraordinary course in discipline and training. Anecdotal and archaeological information from the time of the ninth-century Abbasid dynasty, and later, training manuals of the Egyptian Mamluks and others reveal the methods that could produce the remarkable skills of slave-soldiers—mamluks. Let me give two useful examples of these skills. The Egyptian mamluks were expected, in normal practice, to be able to shoot three arrows in one and a half seconds; and to strike with the sword, while galloping, three times a second.[13] The slave-soldiers of Delhi may well have attained such skills, and the other, more numerous cavalrymen in the sultans’ service may have approximated them—at least to the point of outshooting the galloping Mongols. As Amir Khusrau put it, “Although each year the Mongols come from Khurasan … [they] yield up their ghosts wherever the Turks send the showers of their fatal arrows.”[14]
[1] ‘Ala al-Din Juvaini, The History of the World-Conqueror, J.A. Boyle trans. (Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 1958), I, 141-42.
[2] J.M. Smith, Jr., “ Ayn Jalut: Mamluk Success or Mongol Failure?” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 44:2 (1984). Idem, “Nomads on Ponies vs Slave on Horses,” review article on Reuven Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 1260-1281, forthcoming in the Journal of the American Oriental Society, 118:1.
[3] Ibn Batuta, The Travels of Ibn Battuta, H.A.R. Gibb trans. (Cambridge UK: Cambridge UP, 1962), II, 478.
[4] I.V. Larin, Pasture Rotation, 3rd ed. (Moscow: State Publishing House of Agricultural Literature), trans. Israel Program for Scientific Translations (Jerusalem, 1962), 144.
[5] J.M. Smith, Jr., “Mongol Manpower and Persian Population,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 18:3 (1975).
[6] Rashid al-Din, The Successors of Genghis Khan, J.A. Boyle trans. [RaD/B] (New York: Columbia UP, 1971), 52 and n. 197.
[7] J.A. Boyle, “The Mongol Commanders in Afghanistan and India According to the Tabaqat-I-Nasiri of Juzjani,” Islamic Studies, II (1963); reprinted in idem, The Mongol World Empire (London: Variorum, 1977), see ch. IX, p. 239.
[8] RaD/B, 144.
[9] RaD/B, 142.
[10] J.A. Boyle, “Mongol Commanders,” p. 240.
[11] Ibid., p. 242.
[12] Ibn Batuta, II, 479.
[13] On this archery, see Taybugha, Saracen Archery, J.D. Latham and W.F. Paterson ed. and trans. (London: Holland, 1970), 138 pt. vii, and 142, pt. 5; and Anon., Arab Archery, N.A. Faris and R.P. Elmer ed. and trans. (Princeton, 1945), 150-51. I have discussed the archery techniques of the Mongols and the Egyptian Mamluks, and their tactical implications, in “Mongol Society and Military in the Middle East: Antecedents and Adaptations,” in War and Society in the Eastern Mediterranean, 7th-15th Centuries, Y.Lev ed. (Leiden: Brill, 1997).
For the sword technique, see H. Rabie, “The Training of the Mamluk Faris,” War, Technology and Society in the Middle East, V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp eds. (London: Oxford UP, 1975), 162.
[14] A. Wink, Al-Hind: the Making of the Indo-Islamic World, II (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 207.
Mongol invasions of India
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mongol_invasions_of_India
The Mongol Empire launched several Mongol invasions into the Indian subcontinent from 1221 to 1327. Some of those later raids were made by the unruly Qaraunas of Mongol origin. The Mongols made Kashmir their vassal state. The Mongol Empire also occupied most of modern Pakistan and Punjab for decades. However, the campaigns against the Delhi Sultanate proved unsuccessful, in spite of constant Mongol incursions.
After pursuing Jalal ad-Din into India from Samarkand and defeating him at the battle of Indus in 1221, Genghis Khan sent two tumens (20,000 soldiers) under commanders Dorbei the Fierce and Bala to continue the chase. The Mongol commander Bala chased Jalal ad-Din throughout the Punjab region and attacked outlying towns like Bhera and Multan and had even sacked the outskirts of Lahore. Jalal ad-Din regrouped, forming a small army from survivors of the battle and sought an alliance, or even an asylum, with the Turkic rulers of Delhi Sultanate, but was turned down.
Jalal ad-Din fought against the local rulers in the Punjab, and usually defeated them in the open but could not occupy their lands. At last he proposed an alliance with the khokhar chieftain of the Salt Range and married his daughter. The Khokhar Rai's son joined Jalal ad-Din's army along with his clansmen and received the title of Kalich (sword) Khan. Jalal ad-Din's soldiers were under his officers Uzbek Pai and Hassan Qarlugh.
Khokhar tribe of punjab was in alliance with Mongols during their invasion of India.[1]
While fighting against the local governor of Sindh, Jalal ad-Din heard of an uprising in the Kirman province of southern Iran and he immediately set out for that place, passing through southern Baluchistan on the way. Jalal ad-Din was also joined by forces from Ghor and Peshawar, including members of the Khilji, Turkoman, and Ghori tribes. With his new allies he marched on Ghazni and defeated a Mongol division under Turtai, which had been assigned the task of hunting him down. The victorious allies quarreled over the division of the captured booty; subsequently the Khilji, Turkoman, and Ghori tribesmen deserted Jalal ad-Din and returned to Peshawar. By this time Ögedei Khan, third son of Genghis Khan, had become Great Khan of the Mongol Empire. A Mongol general named Chormaqan sent by the Khan attacked and defeated him, thus ending the Khwārazm-Shāh dynasty.[2]
Some time after 1235 another Mongol force invaded Kashmir, stationing a darughachi (administrative governor) there for several years, and Kashmir became a Mongolian dependency.[3] Around the same time, a Kashmiri Buddhist master, Otochi, and his brother Namo arrived at the court of Ögedei. Another Mongol general named Pakchak attacked Peshawar and defeated the army of tribes who had deserted Jalal ad-Din but were still a threat to the Mongols. These men, mostly Khiljis, escaped to Multan and were recruited into the army of the Delhi Sultanate. In winter 1241 the Mongol force invaded the Indus valley and besieged Lahore. General Dayir was killed while storming the town. However, on December 30, 1241, the Mongols under Munggetu butchered the town before withdrawing from the Delhi Sultanate.[4] At the same time the Great Khan Ögedei died (1241).
The Kashmiris revolted in 1254-1255, and Möngke Khan, who became Great Khan in 1251, appointed his generals, Sali and Takudar, to replace the court and appointed the Buddhist master, Otochi, as darugachi of Kashmir. However, the Kashmiri king killed Otochi at Srinagar. Sali invaded Kashmir, killing the king, and put down the rebellion, after which the country remained subject to the Mongol Empire for many years.[5]
The Delhi prince, Jalal al-Din Masud, traveled to the Mongol capital at Karakorum to seek the assistance of Möngke Khan in seizing the throne from his elder brother in 1248. When Möngke was crowned as Great Khan, Jalal al-Din Masud attended the ceremony and asked for help from Möngke. Möngke ordered Sali to assist him to recover his ancestral realm. Sali made successive attacks on Multan and Lahore. Sham al-Din Muhammad Kart, the client malik (ruling prince) of Herat, accompanied the Mongols. Jalal al-Din was installed as client ruler of Lahore, Kujah and Sodra. In 1257 the governor of Sindh offered his entire province to Hulagu Khan, Mongke's brother, and sought Mongol protection from his overlord in Delhi. Hulagu led a strong force under Sali Bahadur into Sindh. In the winter of 1257 - beginning of 1258, Sali Noyan entered Sind in strength and dismantled the fortifications of Multan; his forces may also have invested the island fortress of Bakhkar on the Indus.
But Hulagu refused to sanction a grand invasion of the Delhi Sultanate and a few years later diplomatic correspondence between the two rulers confirmed the growing desire for peace. Hulagu had many other areas of conquests to take care of in Syria and southwestern Asia. Large-scale Mongol invasions of India ceased and the Delhi Sultans used the respite to recover the frontier towns like Multan, Uch, and Lahore, and to punish the local Ranas and Rais who had joined hands with either the Khwarazim or the Mongol invaders.
Large numbers of tribes that took shelter in the Delhi Sultanate as a result of the Mongol invasions changed the balance of power in North India. The Khilji tribe usurped power from the older Delhi Sultans and began to rapidly project their power into other parts of India. At about this time the Mongol raids into India were also renewed (1300).
The Tushar sources claim invasions by hundreds of thousands of Mongols, numbers approximating (and probably based on) the size of the entire cavalry armies of the Mongol realms of Central Asia or the Middle East: about 150,000 men. A count of the Mongol commanders named in the sources as participating in the various invasions might give a better indication of the numbers involved, as these commanders probably led tumens, units nominally of 10,000 men.[6] These invasions were led by either various descendants of Genghis Khan or by Mongol divisional commanders; the size of such armies was always between 10,000-30,000 cavalry although the Muslim chroniclers of Delhi exaggerated the number to 100,000-200,000 cavalry, which was their norm in describing enemy forces.[7]
After civil war broke out in the Mongol Empire in the 1260s, the Chagatai Khanate controlled Central Asia and its leader since the 1280s was Duwa Khan who was second in command of Kaidu Khan. Duwa was active in Afghanistan, and attempted to extend Mongol rule into India. Negudari governor Abdullah, who was a son of Chagatai Khan's great grandson,[8] invaded Punjab with his force in 1292, but their advance guard under Ulghu was defeated and taken prisoner by the Khalji Sultan. He was intimidated by the main Mongol army and bought off their attacks for a price. The 4000 Mongol captives of the advance guard converted to Islam and came to live in Delhi as "new Muslims". The suburb they lived in was appropriately named Mughalpura.[9] Chagatai tumens were beaten by the Delhi Sultanate several times in 1296-1297.[10] The Mongols thereafter repeatedly invaded northern India. On at least two occasions, they came in strength.
The two armies met at Jalandhar in 1297. Zafar Khan defeated the Mongols in this first invasion. The Mongols attacked again under the command of Saldi and captured the fort at Siri. Zafar Khan, holding the honour of being one of the few undefeated military commanders in history, had no problem crushing this army. He recaptured the fort and brought 2,000 Mongol prisoners before Alauddin Khilji.
During Mongol incursions in 1298, a mixed Turk-Mongol army fought against the Rajput Kings. The Mongols quarreled with the Turk commander and killed his brother in an argument over the distribution of captured wealth. The wives and children of these Mongols were treated with ferocious cruelty and they escaped to the forts of the Rajputs.
Shortly afterward, Duwa Khan sought to end the ongoing conflict with the Yuan Khagan Temür Öljeytü, and around 1304 a general peace among the Mongol khanates was declared, bringing an end to the conflict between the Yuan Dynasty and western khanates that had lasted for the better part of a half century. Soon after, he proposed a joint Mongol attack on India, but the campaign did not materialize.
In 1299, against advice, Delhi sultan Alauddin Khilji attacked the Mongols. The advance guard of the Khilji army was led by Zafar Khan himself. He defeated the Mongols and pursued of them as they withdrew. However, the Mongol general Qutlugh Khwaja tricked Zafar into a position where he was surrounded and killed by the Mongols. However, in face of Alauddin Khilji's continued offensives, they had to retreat to the heights from where they had come.
The Mongols took a long time to rally from this setback. Then they attacked at the worst time possible for Alauddin Khilji – when he was busy laying siege to Chittor. This time the Mongols traveled light. An army of 12,000 under Targhi's leadership moved to Delhi in a swift attack; many governors could not send their troops to Delhi in time.
Alauddin Khilji was forced to retreat to Siri for about two months. The Mongols attacked and pillaged not only the surrounding areas, but Delhi itself.[11]
Alauddin Khilji continued to hold the fortress at Siri; Targhi withdrew the siege after a few months and left the area. Barani, a contemporary historian at that time, attributed this "marvel" to the prayers of the Sufi mystic Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya.
Alauddin Khilji had the forts along the border strengthened and equipped with larger garrisons. New, more effective fortifications were built in the area. A whole new army with its own special governor was created whose portfolio was managing and guarding the border areas.
Despite these measures, the Mongols under the leadership of Ali Beg and Tartaq suddenly appeared in Punjab and the neighbourhood of Amroha. The Mongols plundered Punjab and burnt everything along the way.
Alauddin Khilji sent a strong army led by two of his toughest generals: Ghazi Malik and the famous Malik Kafur to engage the invaders. They surprised the Mongols on their way back to Central Asia with their plunder. Kubak and other Mongol generals were captured and brought back to Siri, along with other prisoners. Alauddin Khilji had the generals trampled to death by elephants while the other prisoners were put to death and their heads hung from the walls of the fort.
The Mongols returned under the leadership of Kebek, who became a khan later in 1306. They crossed the Indus River near Multan and were moving towards the Himalayas, when Ghazi Malik, governor of Punjab, intercepted them. About 50,000 Mongols were made prisoners including one of their generals. Alauddin Khilji put them all to death and sold their wives and children as slaves.
The last Mongol invasion of this period took place in 1307-8 under Iqbalmand and Tai Bu. They had just about managed to cross the Indus when Alauddin Khilji's armies overtook them and put them all to the sword. In that same year the Mongol Khan, Duwa, died and in the dispute over his succession this spate of Mongol raids into India ended.
Alauddin Khilji was an original thinker and brilliant as a strategist. He sent plundering armies under the veteran general Ghazi Malik to Kandhar, Ghazni and Kabul. These offensives effectively crippled the Mongol line of control leading to India.
After besieging and taking Siwana, Jalor, and Warangal, the Indian army, led by the Alauddin Khilji Indian slave commander Malik Kafur, invaded Malababar from Devagiri in 1311. They returned with immense amounts of gold and other booty. After the Mongol commander Abachi tried to kill Kafur, Alauddin had him executed. Believing that thousands of Mongols who were captives and later converted into Islam in Delhi were conspiring to kill him, the Sultan ordered all Mongols arrested, and about 20,000 were reported to have been executed. The court of Delhi also executed emissaries of Oljeitu, the Ilkhan of Mongol Persia.
In 1320 the Qaraunas under Zulju (Dulucha) entered Kashmir by the Jehlam Valley without meeting any serious resistance. The Kashmiri king, Suhadeva, tried to persuade Zulju to withdraw by paying a large ransom.[12] After he failed to organize resistance, Suhadeva fled to Kishtwar, leaving the people of Kashmir to the mercy of Zulju. The Mongols burned the dwellings, massacred the men and made women and children slaves. Only refugees under Ramacandra, commander in chief of the king, in the fort of Lar remained safe. The invaders continued to pillage for eight months until the commencement of winter. When Zulju was departing via Brinal, he lost most of his men and prisoners due to a severe snowfall in Divasar district.
The next major Mongol invasion took place after the Khiljis had been replaced by the Tughlaq dynasty in the Sultanate. In 1327 the Chagatai Mongols under Tarmashirin, who had sent envoys to Delhi to negotiate peace the previous year, sacked the frontier towns of Lamghan and Multan and besieged Delhi. The Tughlaq ruler paid a large ransom to spare his Sultanate from further ravages. Muhammad bin Tughluq asked the Ilkhan Abu Sa'id to form an alliance against Tarmashirin, who had invaded Khorasan, but an attack didn't materialize.[13] Tarmashirin was a Buddhist who later converted to Islam. Religious tensions in the Chagatai Khanate were a divisive factor among the Mongols.
No more large-scale invasions or even raids took place in India; by this time the Mongol attempt to conquer India had finally ended in failure. However, small groups of Mongol adventurers hired out their swords to the many local powers in the northwest. Amir Qazaghan raided northern India with his Qara'unas. He also sent several thousand troops to aid the Delhi Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq in suppressing the rebellion in his country in 1350.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mongol_invasions_of_India
The Mongol Empire launched several Mongol invasions into the Indian subcontinent from 1221 to 1327. Some of those later raids were made by the unruly Qaraunas of Mongol origin. The Mongols made Kashmir their vassal state. The Mongol Empire also occupied most of modern Pakistan and Punjab for decades. However, the campaigns against the Delhi Sultanate proved unsuccessful, in spite of constant Mongol incursions.
After pursuing Jalal ad-Din into India from Samarkand and defeating him at the battle of Indus in 1221, Genghis Khan sent two tumens (20,000 soldiers) under commanders Dorbei the Fierce and Bala to continue the chase. The Mongol commander Bala chased Jalal ad-Din throughout the Punjab region and attacked outlying towns like Bhera and Multan and had even sacked the outskirts of Lahore. Jalal ad-Din regrouped, forming a small army from survivors of the battle and sought an alliance, or even an asylum, with the Turkic rulers of Delhi Sultanate, but was turned down.
Jalal ad-Din fought against the local rulers in the Punjab, and usually defeated them in the open but could not occupy their lands. At last he proposed an alliance with the khokhar chieftain of the Salt Range and married his daughter. The Khokhar Rai's son joined Jalal ad-Din's army along with his clansmen and received the title of Kalich (sword) Khan. Jalal ad-Din's soldiers were under his officers Uzbek Pai and Hassan Qarlugh.
Khokhar tribe of punjab was in alliance with Mongols during their invasion of India.[1]
While fighting against the local governor of Sindh, Jalal ad-Din heard of an uprising in the Kirman province of southern Iran and he immediately set out for that place, passing through southern Baluchistan on the way. Jalal ad-Din was also joined by forces from Ghor and Peshawar, including members of the Khilji, Turkoman, and Ghori tribes. With his new allies he marched on Ghazni and defeated a Mongol division under Turtai, which had been assigned the task of hunting him down. The victorious allies quarreled over the division of the captured booty; subsequently the Khilji, Turkoman, and Ghori tribesmen deserted Jalal ad-Din and returned to Peshawar. By this time Ögedei Khan, third son of Genghis Khan, had become Great Khan of the Mongol Empire. A Mongol general named Chormaqan sent by the Khan attacked and defeated him, thus ending the Khwārazm-Shāh dynasty.[2]
Some time after 1235 another Mongol force invaded Kashmir, stationing a darughachi (administrative governor) there for several years, and Kashmir became a Mongolian dependency.[3] Around the same time, a Kashmiri Buddhist master, Otochi, and his brother Namo arrived at the court of Ögedei. Another Mongol general named Pakchak attacked Peshawar and defeated the army of tribes who had deserted Jalal ad-Din but were still a threat to the Mongols. These men, mostly Khiljis, escaped to Multan and were recruited into the army of the Delhi Sultanate. In winter 1241 the Mongol force invaded the Indus valley and besieged Lahore. General Dayir was killed while storming the town. However, on December 30, 1241, the Mongols under Munggetu butchered the town before withdrawing from the Delhi Sultanate.[4] At the same time the Great Khan Ögedei died (1241).
The Kashmiris revolted in 1254-1255, and Möngke Khan, who became Great Khan in 1251, appointed his generals, Sali and Takudar, to replace the court and appointed the Buddhist master, Otochi, as darugachi of Kashmir. However, the Kashmiri king killed Otochi at Srinagar. Sali invaded Kashmir, killing the king, and put down the rebellion, after which the country remained subject to the Mongol Empire for many years.[5]
The Delhi prince, Jalal al-Din Masud, traveled to the Mongol capital at Karakorum to seek the assistance of Möngke Khan in seizing the throne from his elder brother in 1248. When Möngke was crowned as Great Khan, Jalal al-Din Masud attended the ceremony and asked for help from Möngke. Möngke ordered Sali to assist him to recover his ancestral realm. Sali made successive attacks on Multan and Lahore. Sham al-Din Muhammad Kart, the client malik (ruling prince) of Herat, accompanied the Mongols. Jalal al-Din was installed as client ruler of Lahore, Kujah and Sodra. In 1257 the governor of Sindh offered his entire province to Hulagu Khan, Mongke's brother, and sought Mongol protection from his overlord in Delhi. Hulagu led a strong force under Sali Bahadur into Sindh. In the winter of 1257 - beginning of 1258, Sali Noyan entered Sind in strength and dismantled the fortifications of Multan; his forces may also have invested the island fortress of Bakhkar on the Indus.
But Hulagu refused to sanction a grand invasion of the Delhi Sultanate and a few years later diplomatic correspondence between the two rulers confirmed the growing desire for peace. Hulagu had many other areas of conquests to take care of in Syria and southwestern Asia. Large-scale Mongol invasions of India ceased and the Delhi Sultans used the respite to recover the frontier towns like Multan, Uch, and Lahore, and to punish the local Ranas and Rais who had joined hands with either the Khwarazim or the Mongol invaders.
Large numbers of tribes that took shelter in the Delhi Sultanate as a result of the Mongol invasions changed the balance of power in North India. The Khilji tribe usurped power from the older Delhi Sultans and began to rapidly project their power into other parts of India. At about this time the Mongol raids into India were also renewed (1300).
The Tushar sources claim invasions by hundreds of thousands of Mongols, numbers approximating (and probably based on) the size of the entire cavalry armies of the Mongol realms of Central Asia or the Middle East: about 150,000 men. A count of the Mongol commanders named in the sources as participating in the various invasions might give a better indication of the numbers involved, as these commanders probably led tumens, units nominally of 10,000 men.[6] These invasions were led by either various descendants of Genghis Khan or by Mongol divisional commanders; the size of such armies was always between 10,000-30,000 cavalry although the Muslim chroniclers of Delhi exaggerated the number to 100,000-200,000 cavalry, which was their norm in describing enemy forces.[7]
After civil war broke out in the Mongol Empire in the 1260s, the Chagatai Khanate controlled Central Asia and its leader since the 1280s was Duwa Khan who was second in command of Kaidu Khan. Duwa was active in Afghanistan, and attempted to extend Mongol rule into India. Negudari governor Abdullah, who was a son of Chagatai Khan's great grandson,[8] invaded Punjab with his force in 1292, but their advance guard under Ulghu was defeated and taken prisoner by the Khalji Sultan. He was intimidated by the main Mongol army and bought off their attacks for a price. The 4000 Mongol captives of the advance guard converted to Islam and came to live in Delhi as "new Muslims". The suburb they lived in was appropriately named Mughalpura.[9] Chagatai tumens were beaten by the Delhi Sultanate several times in 1296-1297.[10] The Mongols thereafter repeatedly invaded northern India. On at least two occasions, they came in strength.
The two armies met at Jalandhar in 1297. Zafar Khan defeated the Mongols in this first invasion. The Mongols attacked again under the command of Saldi and captured the fort at Siri. Zafar Khan, holding the honour of being one of the few undefeated military commanders in history, had no problem crushing this army. He recaptured the fort and brought 2,000 Mongol prisoners before Alauddin Khilji.
During Mongol incursions in 1298, a mixed Turk-Mongol army fought against the Rajput Kings. The Mongols quarreled with the Turk commander and killed his brother in an argument over the distribution of captured wealth. The wives and children of these Mongols were treated with ferocious cruelty and they escaped to the forts of the Rajputs.
Shortly afterward, Duwa Khan sought to end the ongoing conflict with the Yuan Khagan Temür Öljeytü, and around 1304 a general peace among the Mongol khanates was declared, bringing an end to the conflict between the Yuan Dynasty and western khanates that had lasted for the better part of a half century. Soon after, he proposed a joint Mongol attack on India, but the campaign did not materialize.
In 1299, against advice, Delhi sultan Alauddin Khilji attacked the Mongols. The advance guard of the Khilji army was led by Zafar Khan himself. He defeated the Mongols and pursued of them as they withdrew. However, the Mongol general Qutlugh Khwaja tricked Zafar into a position where he was surrounded and killed by the Mongols. However, in face of Alauddin Khilji's continued offensives, they had to retreat to the heights from where they had come.
The Mongols took a long time to rally from this setback. Then they attacked at the worst time possible for Alauddin Khilji – when he was busy laying siege to Chittor. This time the Mongols traveled light. An army of 12,000 under Targhi's leadership moved to Delhi in a swift attack; many governors could not send their troops to Delhi in time.
Alauddin Khilji was forced to retreat to Siri for about two months. The Mongols attacked and pillaged not only the surrounding areas, but Delhi itself.[11]
Alauddin Khilji continued to hold the fortress at Siri; Targhi withdrew the siege after a few months and left the area. Barani, a contemporary historian at that time, attributed this "marvel" to the prayers of the Sufi mystic Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya.
Alauddin Khilji had the forts along the border strengthened and equipped with larger garrisons. New, more effective fortifications were built in the area. A whole new army with its own special governor was created whose portfolio was managing and guarding the border areas.
Despite these measures, the Mongols under the leadership of Ali Beg and Tartaq suddenly appeared in Punjab and the neighbourhood of Amroha. The Mongols plundered Punjab and burnt everything along the way.
Alauddin Khilji sent a strong army led by two of his toughest generals: Ghazi Malik and the famous Malik Kafur to engage the invaders. They surprised the Mongols on their way back to Central Asia with their plunder. Kubak and other Mongol generals were captured and brought back to Siri, along with other prisoners. Alauddin Khilji had the generals trampled to death by elephants while the other prisoners were put to death and their heads hung from the walls of the fort.
The Mongols returned under the leadership of Kebek, who became a khan later in 1306. They crossed the Indus River near Multan and were moving towards the Himalayas, when Ghazi Malik, governor of Punjab, intercepted them. About 50,000 Mongols were made prisoners including one of their generals. Alauddin Khilji put them all to death and sold their wives and children as slaves.
The last Mongol invasion of this period took place in 1307-8 under Iqbalmand and Tai Bu. They had just about managed to cross the Indus when Alauddin Khilji's armies overtook them and put them all to the sword. In that same year the Mongol Khan, Duwa, died and in the dispute over his succession this spate of Mongol raids into India ended.
Alauddin Khilji was an original thinker and brilliant as a strategist. He sent plundering armies under the veteran general Ghazi Malik to Kandhar, Ghazni and Kabul. These offensives effectively crippled the Mongol line of control leading to India.
After besieging and taking Siwana, Jalor, and Warangal, the Indian army, led by the Alauddin Khilji Indian slave commander Malik Kafur, invaded Malababar from Devagiri in 1311. They returned with immense amounts of gold and other booty. After the Mongol commander Abachi tried to kill Kafur, Alauddin had him executed. Believing that thousands of Mongols who were captives and later converted into Islam in Delhi were conspiring to kill him, the Sultan ordered all Mongols arrested, and about 20,000 were reported to have been executed. The court of Delhi also executed emissaries of Oljeitu, the Ilkhan of Mongol Persia.
In 1320 the Qaraunas under Zulju (Dulucha) entered Kashmir by the Jehlam Valley without meeting any serious resistance. The Kashmiri king, Suhadeva, tried to persuade Zulju to withdraw by paying a large ransom.[12] After he failed to organize resistance, Suhadeva fled to Kishtwar, leaving the people of Kashmir to the mercy of Zulju. The Mongols burned the dwellings, massacred the men and made women and children slaves. Only refugees under Ramacandra, commander in chief of the king, in the fort of Lar remained safe. The invaders continued to pillage for eight months until the commencement of winter. When Zulju was departing via Brinal, he lost most of his men and prisoners due to a severe snowfall in Divasar district.
The next major Mongol invasion took place after the Khiljis had been replaced by the Tughlaq dynasty in the Sultanate. In 1327 the Chagatai Mongols under Tarmashirin, who had sent envoys to Delhi to negotiate peace the previous year, sacked the frontier towns of Lamghan and Multan and besieged Delhi. The Tughlaq ruler paid a large ransom to spare his Sultanate from further ravages. Muhammad bin Tughluq asked the Ilkhan Abu Sa'id to form an alliance against Tarmashirin, who had invaded Khorasan, but an attack didn't materialize.[13] Tarmashirin was a Buddhist who later converted to Islam. Religious tensions in the Chagatai Khanate were a divisive factor among the Mongols.
No more large-scale invasions or even raids took place in India; by this time the Mongol attempt to conquer India had finally ended in failure. However, small groups of Mongol adventurers hired out their swords to the many local powers in the northwest. Amir Qazaghan raided northern India with his Qara'unas. He also sent several thousand troops to aid the Delhi Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq in suppressing the rebellion in his country in 1350.
Спасибо.Теперь понятно,что остановило Александра Великого во время его Индийского похода.В источниках слово "экология" камуфлировалось,как непрерывные дожди(муссоны),полчища свирепых диких зверей и змей и т.д.
Но когда все-таки у Чингисхана возникла идея завоевания мира?Если это 1206 г.,
то это наводит на некоторые размышления о сакрально-политической роли,если уместно так выразиться,тенгрианства.Получается,что инагурация Моде,Бумына, Темучина в верховные правители номадов по тенгрианскому обряду автоматически ставила задачу по покорению(завоеванию)мира.Отсюда непрерывные походы и стремление к безмерному расширению имперских границ у правителей гуннов, тюрков,монголов.
Но когда все-таки у Чингисхана возникла идея завоевания мира?Если это 1206 г.,
то это наводит на некоторые размышления о сакрально-политической роли,если уместно так выразиться,тенгрианства.Получается,что инагурация Моде,Бумына, Темучина в верховные правители номадов по тенгрианскому обряду автоматически ставила задачу по покорению(завоеванию)мира.Отсюда непрерывные походы и стремление к безмерному расширению имперских границ у правителей гуннов, тюрков,монголов.
Думаю степные правители понимали невозможность выполнения этой задачи, но деклариловали ее для того чтобы не дать внутренним противоречиям разорвать образованные этими правителями державы. В первую очередь, они хотели объеденить всех кочевников, чтобы умножить свой военный потенциал. Ну и конечно же это прикрывалось волей Тенгри.
Dark_Ambient
Римский гражданин
идея завоевания мира - не более чем красивый миф
до последлнего моря Чингизхан хотел дойти, но в его понятии это был Каспий; кроме того, дойти - не значит все покорить
до последлнего моря Чингизхан хотел дойти, но в его понятии это был Каспий; кроме того, дойти - не значит все покорить
В Казахстане вышла в свет книга Р.Табулдина.Всемирная генеалогия Чингизидов.У кого она есть скажите:есть ли смысл ее приобретать?Или это дубляж из монографий Султанова,Сабитова,Доманина,Ерофеевой,Почекаева и др.Опять же обширный материал был представлен amir на этом форуме.Можно ли в этой работе почерпнуть что то новое по крымским Гиреям?