Гонсальво де Кордоба
- Автор темы тохта
- Дата начала
Вы хотите поговорить о терсио, было где то упоминание(сколько ломал голову не вспомнил где) что ранних терцио, не было уж столько много аркебуз, их было мало по сравнению с классической, и по сути они не далеко ушли от различных пикинеров очень популярных в то время по всей Европе. Вообще терцио сыграло с де Кордобой злую шутку, ибо в истории он остался как новатор, что правда, но зачастую его роль преувеличивают, все эволюционировало скорее. А вот его полководческие таланты идут следом за новаторством, мне кажется это важнее, Его затмили другие полководцы у которых были большие победы, а ему досталось слава папани испанкой военной машины времен расцвета империи.
О военной реформе при короле Фердинанде V Арагонском (1479-1516) и Изабелле Кастильской:
Старое подразделение пехоты на батальи, неравные по числу воинов, заменено на батальоны по 500 солдат, в состав которых входило 10 отрядов - куадрилий.
Позднее, по инициативе Гонсало де Айоры и Гонсало де Кордовы (знаменитого испанского полководца, прозванного "великим капитаном") было введено не только подразделение войска на роты (companias) по 500 чел., но и полки (coronelias в пехоте и escadronas в кавалерии) по 12 рот и изменена тактика ведения боевых действий.
Пехотным полкам были приданы отряды по 600 всадников и пушки...
(Из книги Р. Альтамира-и-Кревеа "История Испании")
Старое подразделение пехоты на батальи, неравные по числу воинов, заменено на батальоны по 500 солдат, в состав которых входило 10 отрядов - куадрилий.
Позднее, по инициативе Гонсало де Айоры и Гонсало де Кордовы (знаменитого испанского полководца, прозванного "великим капитаном") было введено не только подразделение войска на роты (companias) по 500 чел., но и полки (coronelias в пехоте и escadronas в кавалерии) по 12 рот и изменена тактика ведения боевых действий.
Пехотным полкам были приданы отряды по 600 всадников и пушки...
(Из книги Р. Альтамира-и-Кревеа "История Испании")
Первые терции появились только в 1536 г., а Кордова умер в 1515 г.
Подробнее о его реформах есть в "The Spanish Tercios 1536-1704":
One of the chief promoters of reform was Gonzalo Fernбndez de
Cуrdoba, ‘the Great Captain’. The Catholic Monarchs gave this veteran
the command of the Spanish expeditionary corps that travelled to Italy
to fight against a French invasion, in support of King Ferrante of Naples.
At Seminara (28 July 1495), Cуrdoba disagreed with the Neapolitan
nobility’s eagerness to go into battle against the French, as he was aware
of the enemy’s superiority, but he had no option but to agree. Mistaking
a tactical withdrawal by the Spanish horsemen for a retreat, the Italian
4 infantry gave way to panic and fled the battlefield. Only the Spanish
infantry formation stood firm, before beginning an orderly retreat
under pressure from Swiss pikemen and French heavy cavalry
gensdarmes. This event exemplifies one aspect of the reputation earned
by Spanish infantry over the coming centuries – their imperturbability.
Ignoring everything around them, the Spaniards managed to retreat
from the field of Seminara in good order, protected by their pikes from
any approaching enemy. The French, content to have taken the ground,
decided not to contest their withdrawal.
From then on, free from interference, Cуrdoba assumed command
of operations, and began to lay the foundations of future Spanish
military doctrine. The central characteristic of what would be known as
‘war in the Spanish mode’ was watchfulness and realism; Cуrdoba would
fight only when it was in his interest to do so, never when it would favour
the enemy, so his troops gained experience and confidence. He also
employed mixed troops and tactics in ways long familiar to Spanish
commanders: ‘He agreed to… set up ambushes for the French cavalry
in the way used in Spain against the Moors, a true novelty for the people
there’. A main tenet of his doctrine was: ‘Never bring your warriors to
battle unless you are sure of their hearts and know that they are fearless
and orderly; never test them if you do not see that they expect to win’
(Inspecciуn de Infanterнa, La infanterнa…).
Additionally, his infantry were extremely mobile; the varied terrain
favoured them and placed the French heavy cavalry at a disadvantage.
This mobility allowed the Spanish to give the impression that they were
everywhere, repeatedly surprising enemy garrisons. All these factors,
together with the massive use of artillery to take strongholds so as to
avoid long sieges, changed the face of the campaign.
His experience in the Kingdom of Naples encouraged Cуrdoba to
organize coronelнas, field commands inspired by the Roman legions.
He ordered that each capitanнa should consist of 500 men: 200 pikemen,
200 sword-and-buckler men, and 100 arquebusiers with firearms.
Ten mixed companies, plus another two of pikemen alone, formed a
coronelнa commanded by a coronel (colonel), with a total of 6,000 men. This
would also have two attached cavalry squadrons, one with 300 ‘men-atarms’
(heavy cavalry) and the other with 300 ‘horsemen’ (light cavalry).
Two coronelнas made up an army, led by a capitбn general (commander-inchief).
However, two points should be understood. Firstly, these numbers
were only theoretical, and were unlikely to be achieved in practice due to
recruiting problems, desertion, and attrition during campaigns.
Secondly, this organization was not inflexible; the capitanнas could be
concentrated or could operate separately, according to the requirements
of particular operations.
The next Italian (or Neapolitan) war would further refine the new
ways of fighting. On 23 April 1503, at Cerignola, Fernбndez de Cуrdoba
crushed a French army and won a resounding victory by the massed use
of firearms from behind obstacles created on carefully chosen terrain.
Outnumbered by the French and Swiss led by the Duke of Nemours,
Cуrdoba emplaced his 6,000 men on a hillside protected by ditches and
palisades. A disastrous powder explosion robbed Cуrdoba of the use of
his artillery from the outset, and the French heavy cavalry and Swiss
pikemen attacked with support from their own cannon. Nevertheless,
volley-fire from the Spanish arquebusiers reduced the attackers to
confusion, and was followed by a devastating counter-attack by
Cуrdoba’s Landsknecht mercenaries, Spanish infantry and cavalry.
Подробнее о его реформах есть в "The Spanish Tercios 1536-1704":
One of the chief promoters of reform was Gonzalo Fernбndez de
Cуrdoba, ‘the Great Captain’. The Catholic Monarchs gave this veteran
the command of the Spanish expeditionary corps that travelled to Italy
to fight against a French invasion, in support of King Ferrante of Naples.
At Seminara (28 July 1495), Cуrdoba disagreed with the Neapolitan
nobility’s eagerness to go into battle against the French, as he was aware
of the enemy’s superiority, but he had no option but to agree. Mistaking
a tactical withdrawal by the Spanish horsemen for a retreat, the Italian
4 infantry gave way to panic and fled the battlefield. Only the Spanish
infantry formation stood firm, before beginning an orderly retreat
under pressure from Swiss pikemen and French heavy cavalry
gensdarmes. This event exemplifies one aspect of the reputation earned
by Spanish infantry over the coming centuries – their imperturbability.
Ignoring everything around them, the Spaniards managed to retreat
from the field of Seminara in good order, protected by their pikes from
any approaching enemy. The French, content to have taken the ground,
decided not to contest their withdrawal.
From then on, free from interference, Cуrdoba assumed command
of operations, and began to lay the foundations of future Spanish
military doctrine. The central characteristic of what would be known as
‘war in the Spanish mode’ was watchfulness and realism; Cуrdoba would
fight only when it was in his interest to do so, never when it would favour
the enemy, so his troops gained experience and confidence. He also
employed mixed troops and tactics in ways long familiar to Spanish
commanders: ‘He agreed to… set up ambushes for the French cavalry
in the way used in Spain against the Moors, a true novelty for the people
there’. A main tenet of his doctrine was: ‘Never bring your warriors to
battle unless you are sure of their hearts and know that they are fearless
and orderly; never test them if you do not see that they expect to win’
(Inspecciуn de Infanterнa, La infanterнa…).
Additionally, his infantry were extremely mobile; the varied terrain
favoured them and placed the French heavy cavalry at a disadvantage.
This mobility allowed the Spanish to give the impression that they were
everywhere, repeatedly surprising enemy garrisons. All these factors,
together with the massive use of artillery to take strongholds so as to
avoid long sieges, changed the face of the campaign.
His experience in the Kingdom of Naples encouraged Cуrdoba to
organize coronelнas, field commands inspired by the Roman legions.
He ordered that each capitanнa should consist of 500 men: 200 pikemen,
200 sword-and-buckler men, and 100 arquebusiers with firearms.
Ten mixed companies, plus another two of pikemen alone, formed a
coronelнa commanded by a coronel (colonel), with a total of 6,000 men. This
would also have two attached cavalry squadrons, one with 300 ‘men-atarms’
(heavy cavalry) and the other with 300 ‘horsemen’ (light cavalry).
Two coronelнas made up an army, led by a capitбn general (commander-inchief).
However, two points should be understood. Firstly, these numbers
were only theoretical, and were unlikely to be achieved in practice due to
recruiting problems, desertion, and attrition during campaigns.
Secondly, this organization was not inflexible; the capitanнas could be
concentrated or could operate separately, according to the requirements
of particular operations.
The next Italian (or Neapolitan) war would further refine the new
ways of fighting. On 23 April 1503, at Cerignola, Fernбndez de Cуrdoba
crushed a French army and won a resounding victory by the massed use
of firearms from behind obstacles created on carefully chosen terrain.
Outnumbered by the French and Swiss led by the Duke of Nemours,
Cуrdoba emplaced his 6,000 men on a hillside protected by ditches and
palisades. A disastrous powder explosion robbed Cуrdoba of the use of
his artillery from the outset, and the French heavy cavalry and Swiss
pikemen attacked with support from their own cannon. Nevertheless,
volley-fire from the Spanish arquebusiers reduced the attackers to
confusion, and was followed by a devastating counter-attack by
Cуrdoba’s Landsknecht mercenaries, Spanish infantry and cavalry.
Ща, еще больше запутаю вас, терция существовала всегда, потому как " музыка будет вечной". А военная терция существует до сих пор и ионизуется, да да с пиками и мушкетами(ирония) __________
Боевой строй терция появился как раз во времена Кордобы(в вашей цитате это есть), что касается деления войска по образцу полк, рота то оно действительно появилось 30-х XVI века, с появлением первых регулярных формирований(а без этого смысла нет делить), деление не на полки а не на терции до сих пор в Испании сохранилось.
__________
Боевой строй терция появился как раз во времена Кордобы(в вашей цитате это есть), что касается деления войска по образцу полк, рота то оно действительно появилось 30-х XVI века, с появлением первых регулярных формирований(а без этого смысла нет делить), деление не на полки а не на терции до сих пор в Испании сохранилось.
А что здесь запутанного? Надо точнее выражаться, что вы имеете ввиду: "терцию" - как боевое построение пехоты или "терцию" - как войсковую единицу.
А насчет того, что "терция существовала всегда" - к чему эта реплика?
Испания, как известно, как соединенное королевство прежде независимых государств появилась лишь в конце 15 века.
Rzay
Дистрибьютор добра
Очевидно имелся в виду музыкальный термин.