"Орлы" Квинтилия Вара
- Автор темы мирабелла
- Дата начала
Aelia
Virgo Maxima
Первых двух - Германик.
Тацит, Анналы, I, 60 (15 г.)
Бруктеров, поджегших свои селения, рассеял Луций Стертиний, посланный Германиком с отрядом легковооруженных; истребляя неприятеля, он среди добычи обнаруживает орла девятнадцатого легиона, захваченного врагами при поражении Вара.
II, 25 (16 г.)
Слух о гибели флота возродил в германцах воинственный пыл, и это заставило Цезаря (Германика - А.) принять необходимые меры. Он велит Гаю Силию с тридцатью тысячами пехотинцев и тремя тысячами всадников выступить в поход против хаттов; сам он с еще большим войском нападает на марсов, недавно передавшийся римлянам вождь которых Малловенд сообщил, что зарытый в находящейся поблизости роще орел одного из легионов Квинтилия Вара охраняется ничтожными силами. Туда немедленно был выслан отряд с предписанием отвлечь неприятеля на себя, и другой — чтобы, обойдя его с тыла, выкопать орла из земли; и тем и другим сопутствовала удача.
А третьего вернули только при Клавдии:
Дион Кассий, LX, 8
This same year (41 г. - А.), however, Sulpicius Galba overcame the Chatti, and Publius Gabinius conquered the Cauchia and as a crowning achievement recovered a military eagle, the only one that still remained in the hands of the enemy from Varus' disaster.
Тацит, Анналы, I, 60 (15 г.)
Бруктеров, поджегших свои селения, рассеял Луций Стертиний, посланный Германиком с отрядом легковооруженных; истребляя неприятеля, он среди добычи обнаруживает орла девятнадцатого легиона, захваченного врагами при поражении Вара.
II, 25 (16 г.)
Слух о гибели флота возродил в германцах воинственный пыл, и это заставило Цезаря (Германика - А.) принять необходимые меры. Он велит Гаю Силию с тридцатью тысячами пехотинцев и тремя тысячами всадников выступить в поход против хаттов; сам он с еще большим войском нападает на марсов, недавно передавшийся римлянам вождь которых Малловенд сообщил, что зарытый в находящейся поблизости роще орел одного из легионов Квинтилия Вара охраняется ничтожными силами. Туда немедленно был выслан отряд с предписанием отвлечь неприятеля на себя, и другой — чтобы, обойдя его с тыла, выкопать орла из земли; и тем и другим сопутствовала удача.
А третьего вернули только при Клавдии:
Дион Кассий, LX, 8
This same year (41 г. - А.), however, Sulpicius Galba overcame the Chatti, and Publius Gabinius conquered the Cauchia and as a crowning achievement recovered a military eagle, the only one that still remained in the hands of the enemy from Varus' disaster.
nasty knight
Консул
А как быть с этим:
"Hа Нижнем Рейне был построен новый форт, Лауриум, который Калигула использовал для похода против хавков, во время которого военачальник Публий Габиний Секунд смог отвоевать штандарт одного из легионов, разгромленных в Тевтобургском лесу."
"Hа Нижнем Рейне был построен новый форт, Лауриум, который Калигула использовал для похода против хавков, во время которого военачальник Публий Габиний Секунд смог отвоевать штандарт одного из легионов, разгромленных в Тевтобургском лесу."
nasty knight
Консул
Это из Википедии, здесь: http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9A%D0%B0%....83.D1.80.D0.B0
Aelia
Virgo Maxima
Ошибка в Википедии.
Этот человек - Публий Габиний Секунд упоминается только в двух источниках, и оба раза в связи с Клавдием. Диона Кассия я уже процитировала, а вот Светоний, "Клавдий", 24, 3
(3) Триумфальные украшения Силану, жениху своей дочери, он (Клавдий - А.) назначил, когда тот был еще подростком, а людям постарше он давал их так широко и с такой легкостью, что ходило письмо от имени всех легионов с просьбой, чтобы легаты консульского звания, получая войска, сразу получали и триумфальные украшения и не искали бы любого повода завести войну. Авлу Плавтию он назначил даже овацию, а когда тот вступил в Рим, то он вышел ему навстречу и сопровождал на Капитолий и с Капитолия, шагая по левую руку от него. А Габинию Секунду, победившему германское племя хавков, он позволил принять даже прозвище Хавка.
Видимо, ошибка вызвана тем, что эта победа была одержана в 41 г. - это как раз год, когда Калигулу сменил Клавдий. Возможно даже, что еще Калигула, а не Клавдий, назначил Габиния легатом. Но, если верить Диону Кассию (а других источников нет), то победа была одержана уже в правление Клавдия.
Этот человек - Публий Габиний Секунд упоминается только в двух источниках, и оба раза в связи с Клавдием. Диона Кассия я уже процитировала, а вот Светоний, "Клавдий", 24, 3
(3) Триумфальные украшения Силану, жениху своей дочери, он (Клавдий - А.) назначил, когда тот был еще подростком, а людям постарше он давал их так широко и с такой легкостью, что ходило письмо от имени всех легионов с просьбой, чтобы легаты консульского звания, получая войска, сразу получали и триумфальные украшения и не искали бы любого повода завести войну. Авлу Плавтию он назначил даже овацию, а когда тот вступил в Рим, то он вышел ему навстречу и сопровождал на Капитолий и с Капитолия, шагая по левую руку от него. А Габинию Секунду, победившему германское племя хавков, он позволил принять даже прозвище Хавка.
Видимо, ошибка вызвана тем, что эта победа была одержана в 41 г. - это как раз год, когда Калигулу сменил Клавдий. Возможно даже, что еще Калигула, а не Клавдий, назначил Габиния легатом. Но, если верить Диону Кассию (а других источников нет), то победа была одержана уже в правление Клавдия.
nasty knight
Консул
Скорей, небрежность. Кампанию начал Калигула.
Возможен ли вариант, что победа была одержана до того, как Клавдий сменил Калигулу? Хотя вряд ли, по времени не получается.
Aelia
Virgo Maxima
Нет, не возможен. Благодаря Габинию Клавдий получил аккламацию. Приведу более полную цитату:
6 The freedmen, on their part, persuaded Claudius to accept the ornamenta triumphalia for his exploits in Mauretania, though he had not gained any success and had not yet come to the throne when the war was finished. 7 This same year, however, Sulpicius Galba overcame the Chatti, and Publius Gabinius conquered the Cauchia and as a crowning achievement recovered a military eagle, the only one that still remained in the hands of the enemy from Varus' disaster. Thanks to the exploits of these two men Claudius now received the well-merited title of imperator.
Aelia
Virgo Maxima
Переношу оффтопик из темы про пиктов.
1. К вопросу о том, каково было положение Германии до и после поражения Вара.
Привожу цитату из статьи
E. S. Gruen "The Imperial Policy of Augustus", в книге "Between Republic and Empire. Interpretations of Augustus and His Principate" edited by Kurt A. Raaflaub and Mark Toher 199.3 С. 405-409
Автор доказывает, что по существу после поражения Вара на Рейне мало что изменилось по сравнению с тем, как было до этого. Наиболее важные моменты выделяю.
When Augustus returned to Rome in 13 B.C., his stepson Drusus launched the first of four major offensives against tribes on the far side of the Rhine.[44] They illustrate a continued connection, made explicit by the sources, between suppression of Gallic unrest and the terrorizing by Rome of Germanic peoples who had contributed or might contribute to that unrest. The altar of Augustus at Lugdunum, erected by Drusus, had as its aim the rallying of Gallic loyalty to the regime.[45]
Drusus' fourth and final campaign, in 9 B.C., produced the most far-reaching successes. Drusus attacked the Chatti, defeated the Marcomanni, and got as far as the Elbe. But that proved to be the terminus. Drusus turned back, suffered the misfortune of a broken leg, and died en route to the Rhine.[46] What stayed his advance at the Elbe is unspecified—but Augustan policy demanded that the best face be placed upon events. Drusus, like Alexander the Great at the Hyphasis, set up trophies at the Elbe to signify progress rather than setback. And a story conveniently circulated that Drusus was halted by a vision delivering a divine pronouncement about the fate of the mission.[47] Hence the gods, not Roman failures, accounted for withdrawal. And elaborate honors were showered upon the memory of Drusus and his deeds.[48] Whatever the reality of the situation, Augustus, here as elsewhere, insisted on the appearance of success.
How much had been accomplished in fact? Drusus' campaigns had been invasions rather than conquests, the Germans intimidated rather than subdued. Archaeology discloses important legionary bases on the Lippe and other garrisons elsewhere, but does not permit a precise chronology that would fix them to the time of Drusus' incursions. Tiberius rushed to the scene and repaired the damage with vigorous campaigning in 8 B.C. Among other actions he deported forty thousand Germans to the Gallic side of the Rhine.[49] The exhibition of Roman power is clear, a necessary demonstration in the wake of Drusus' death. But it is rash to speak of Germany organized as a province of the empire, with Roman authority extended to the Elbe.[50] Even Velleius Paterculus, who would hardly minimize Tiberius' accomplishment, speaks only of reducing Germany "almost to the form of a tributary province." And Florus acknowledges that Germany was defeated rather than subdued.[51] Rome held only selected portions of German soil.[52] As so often, the appearance of Roman success outstripped the reality of Roman control.
The need to maintain a posture of strength continued to mark Augustan policy. An altar to Augustus was erected among the Ubii who had settled on the Rhine bank at Cologne. Appointment of a priest to the cult from the Cherusci was clearly meant to signal German allegiance to the princeps and his regime.[53] At some time before A.D. 1, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus crossed the Elbe without any resistance, made an alliance with people on the farther bank of that river, and planted a new altar to Augustus on the site, a symbol that loyalty extended even to that distant region. The idea that his expedition prepared the way for a Roman invasion of Bohemia is unnecessary conjecture. It supplied a means to reassert Roman influence without taking undue risks. Domitius even became embroiled in intratribal disputes among the Cherusci. But he made sure to winter his men back in the safer quarters on the Rhine.[54]
In A.D. 4 Tiberius returned to Germany and launched an ostensibly even more vigorous expedition. If Velleius Paterculus be believed, Tiberius was victorious everywhere, his army unscathed; the victories left nothing unconquered in all Germany except the Marcomanni.[55] Dio Cassius, by contrast, provides a curt and sober assessment: Tiberius advanced to the Weser and the Elbe, but accomplished nothing worthy of record.[56] Only peace treaties resulted, but the legate got triumphal honors, and the princeps and his son were hailed as imperatores .[57] The contrast between appearance and reality persists.
Five legions remained in the Rhine command. But the hand of Rome, it seems, was felt only lightly in Germany. Roman authority extended to parts of the nation, but by no means all. The process of urbanization, establishment of markets, and encouragement of peaceful assemblies that came with the Roman presence advanced without apparent resistance.[58] The new legate, P. Quinctilius Varus, was a man more accustomed to peace than to war.[59] His activities concentrated on the imposition of rules, the exercise of judicial powers, and the collection of revenues—a practice not hitherto implemented in Germany. Dio Cassius appropriately notes that Varus behaved as if the Germans were subject peoples.[60] They were not—as the rebellion of Arminius demonstrated. The Cherusci lulled Varus into complacency, then lured him into an ambush. In the vicinity of the Teutoburg Forest in September A.D. 9, Varus lost his life and Rome lost three legions—a disaster unparalleled in the Augustan years.[61] The news shocked and dispirited the princeps . Augustus reportedly let his hair and beard grow for months as a sign of mourning, and more than once let fly the celebrated lament, "Varus, give me back my legions!"[62] Those histrionics buttress the common view that Varus' defeat marked the major turning point in Augustus' German policy: the plan to pacify all of Germany to the Elbe was given up, and the empire's borders were withdrawn to the Rhine.[63]
It might be more accurate, however, to point to the continuities than to stress the break. Augustus made no public move to surrender. Quite the contrary. Tiberius returned to take command on the Rhine. Roman forces in the area were rebuilt to a total of eight legions, a far larger army than before. Augustus would not give even a suggestion of retreat. Tiberius restricted himself to cautious raids and demonstrations in A.D. 10 and 11. But the demonstrations themselves were important. In the presentation of Velleius Paterculus, they were dynamic offensive maneuvers and aggressive warfare—and that is doubtless the impression Augustus wished to deliver.[64] And in A.D. 13 Augustus appointed Germanicus to supreme command on the Rhine. Germanicus would lead conspicuous offensive campaigns into the interior of Germany. Tacitus pinpointed the motives with accuracy: war on the Germans derived less from the desire to extend the empire or to achieve tangible gain than to wipe out the disgrace of Varus' defeat. The princeps would not allow that calamity to stain Rome's reputation.[65]
The campaigns of Germanicus in A.D. 15 and 16 follow a long familiar pattern. Germanicus claimed major victories and accomplished very little. Despite—or perhaps in consequence of—that fact, he enjoyed lavish honors. Germanicus celebrated a handsome triumph, and his legates received ornamenta triumphalia .[66] When Tiberius recalled Germanicus in A.D. 16, the young general expressed disappointment and asserted that another season's campaigning would have brought the war to an end.[67] Whatever the plausibility of those claims, they were bound to be made. Nor did Tiberius dispute them. Rome halted offensive operations across the Rhine. But Rome also let it be known that it could have subjugated Germany in a year—had it wished.[68] Germanicus' campaigns exemplify once again the repeated discrepancy between achievement and advertisement.
[44] Dio 54.25.1. See R. Frei-Stolba, "Die römische Schweiz: Ausgewählte staats- und verwaltungsrechtliche Probleme im Frühprinzipat," ANRW 2.5.1 (1976) 355–65.
[45] Livy Per. 139; Dio 54.32.1; ILS 212, II, lines 36–39; D. Timpe, "Zur Geschichte der Rheingrenze zwischen Caesar und Drusus," in E. Lefèvre, ed., Monumentum Chiloniense: Kieler Festschrift für E. Burck (Amsterdam 1975) 142; S. Dyson, "Native Revolt Patterns in the Roman Empire," ANRW 2.3 (1975) 155–56.
[46] Dio 55.1.2–5; Florus 2.30.23–27; Strab. 7.1.3 (c291); Livy Per. 141; Suet. Claud. 1.2.
[47] Dio 55.1.3; cf. Suet. Claud. 1.2. On the tale and its significance, see D. Timpe, "Drusus' Umkehr an der Elbe," RhM 110 (1967) 289–306.
[48] Dio 55.2.1–3; Livy Per. 142; Suet. Claud. 1.3–5; Tac. Ann. 2.7.
[49] Dio 55.6.2–3; Suet. Aug. 21; Tib. 9; Tac. Ann. 2.26, 12.39. On the archaeological evidence, see H. Schönberger, "The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey," JRS 59 (1969) 147–49; Wells (supra n. 35) 161–233.
[50] As, for example, do Wells (supra n. 35) 156–57; Kienast (supra n. 35) 300–301.
[51] Vell. Pat. 2.97.4; Florus 2.30.29–30. Florus' claim (2.30.22) that Augustus sought to make Germany a province in order to honor Julius Caesar is not to be taken seriously.
[52] Dio 56.18.1; cf. Christ (supra n. 42) 189–98.
[53] Tac. Ann. 1.39.1, 1.57.2.
[54] Dio 55.10a. 2–3; Tac. Ann . 4.44. The conjecture on Domitius' purpose is that of R. Syme in CAH X, 365–66. The starting point of his expedition remains in dispute: Syme (supra); D. Timpe, "Zur Geschichte und Uberlieferung der Okkupation Germaniens unter Augustus," Saeculum 18 (1967) 280–84; Wells (supra n. 35) 158–59; Christ (supra n. 42) 181–83.
[55] Vell. Pat. 2.106.1–3, 2.107.3, 2.108.1. Similarly, Aufidius Bassus, in Peter, HRRel II, 96, 3.
[56] Dio 55.28.5; cf. Timpe (supra n. 54) 284–88. Note that after the campaign of A.D. 5 Tiberius evidently returned to winter quarters on the Rhine: Vell. Pat. 2.107.3.
[57] Dio 55.28.6.
[58] Dio 56.18.1–2. On this passage, see the astute remarks of Christ (supra n. 42) 194–98 as against Timpe (supra n. 54) 288–90 and id., Arminius-Studien (Heidelberg 1970) 81–90.
[59] Vell. Pat. 2.117.2.
[60] Dio 56.18.3. Other sources, eager to blame the legate for future calamity, stress his combination of greed and ineptitude: Vell. Pat. 2.117.2–2.118.1; Florus 2.30.31.
[61] Vell. Pat. 2.118.2–2.119.5; Dio 56.18.4–56.22.2; Tac. Ann. 1.57–61; Suet. Aug. 23; Tib. 17. The account of Florus (2.30.32–38) is unreliable. On the site of the battle, see E. Koestermann, "Die Feldzüge des Germanicus 14–16 n.Chr.," Historia 6 (1957) 441–43. On Arminius, see Timpe (1970: supra n. 58) 11–49; S. Dyson, "Native Revolts in the Roman Empire," Historia 20 (1971) 253–58. Tacitus' description of Arminius as liberator Germaniae (Ann. 2.88) does not imply that Rome had previously annexed the land as a province.
[62] Suet. Aug. 23.2; Oros. 6.21.27.
[63] Cf. Florus 2.30.39.
[64] Vell. Pat. 2.120.1–2, 2.121.1; Dio 56.24.6, 56.25.2–3; Suet. Tib. 18. The eight Rhine legions are listed in Tac. Ann. 1.37.
[65] Tac. Ann. 1.3.6; cf. Vell. Pat. 2.123.1. The motive is confirmed by Strab. 7.1.4 (c291–92).
Насчет внешней политики Августа и ее предполагаемого изменения напишу позже.
1. К вопросу о том, каково было положение Германии до и после поражения Вара.
Привожу цитату из статьи
E. S. Gruen "The Imperial Policy of Augustus", в книге "Between Republic and Empire. Interpretations of Augustus and His Principate" edited by Kurt A. Raaflaub and Mark Toher 199.3 С. 405-409
Автор доказывает, что по существу после поражения Вара на Рейне мало что изменилось по сравнению с тем, как было до этого. Наиболее важные моменты выделяю.
When Augustus returned to Rome in 13 B.C., his stepson Drusus launched the first of four major offensives against tribes on the far side of the Rhine.[44] They illustrate a continued connection, made explicit by the sources, between suppression of Gallic unrest and the terrorizing by Rome of Germanic peoples who had contributed or might contribute to that unrest. The altar of Augustus at Lugdunum, erected by Drusus, had as its aim the rallying of Gallic loyalty to the regime.[45]
Drusus' fourth and final campaign, in 9 B.C., produced the most far-reaching successes. Drusus attacked the Chatti, defeated the Marcomanni, and got as far as the Elbe. But that proved to be the terminus. Drusus turned back, suffered the misfortune of a broken leg, and died en route to the Rhine.[46] What stayed his advance at the Elbe is unspecified—but Augustan policy demanded that the best face be placed upon events. Drusus, like Alexander the Great at the Hyphasis, set up trophies at the Elbe to signify progress rather than setback. And a story conveniently circulated that Drusus was halted by a vision delivering a divine pronouncement about the fate of the mission.[47] Hence the gods, not Roman failures, accounted for withdrawal. And elaborate honors were showered upon the memory of Drusus and his deeds.[48] Whatever the reality of the situation, Augustus, here as elsewhere, insisted on the appearance of success.
How much had been accomplished in fact? Drusus' campaigns had been invasions rather than conquests, the Germans intimidated rather than subdued. Archaeology discloses important legionary bases on the Lippe and other garrisons elsewhere, but does not permit a precise chronology that would fix them to the time of Drusus' incursions. Tiberius rushed to the scene and repaired the damage with vigorous campaigning in 8 B.C. Among other actions he deported forty thousand Germans to the Gallic side of the Rhine.[49] The exhibition of Roman power is clear, a necessary demonstration in the wake of Drusus' death. But it is rash to speak of Germany organized as a province of the empire, with Roman authority extended to the Elbe.[50] Even Velleius Paterculus, who would hardly minimize Tiberius' accomplishment, speaks only of reducing Germany "almost to the form of a tributary province." And Florus acknowledges that Germany was defeated rather than subdued.[51] Rome held only selected portions of German soil.[52] As so often, the appearance of Roman success outstripped the reality of Roman control.
The need to maintain a posture of strength continued to mark Augustan policy. An altar to Augustus was erected among the Ubii who had settled on the Rhine bank at Cologne. Appointment of a priest to the cult from the Cherusci was clearly meant to signal German allegiance to the princeps and his regime.[53] At some time before A.D. 1, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus crossed the Elbe without any resistance, made an alliance with people on the farther bank of that river, and planted a new altar to Augustus on the site, a symbol that loyalty extended even to that distant region. The idea that his expedition prepared the way for a Roman invasion of Bohemia is unnecessary conjecture. It supplied a means to reassert Roman influence without taking undue risks. Domitius even became embroiled in intratribal disputes among the Cherusci. But he made sure to winter his men back in the safer quarters on the Rhine.[54]
In A.D. 4 Tiberius returned to Germany and launched an ostensibly even more vigorous expedition. If Velleius Paterculus be believed, Tiberius was victorious everywhere, his army unscathed; the victories left nothing unconquered in all Germany except the Marcomanni.[55] Dio Cassius, by contrast, provides a curt and sober assessment: Tiberius advanced to the Weser and the Elbe, but accomplished nothing worthy of record.[56] Only peace treaties resulted, but the legate got triumphal honors, and the princeps and his son were hailed as imperatores .[57] The contrast between appearance and reality persists.
Five legions remained in the Rhine command. But the hand of Rome, it seems, was felt only lightly in Germany. Roman authority extended to parts of the nation, but by no means all. The process of urbanization, establishment of markets, and encouragement of peaceful assemblies that came with the Roman presence advanced without apparent resistance.[58] The new legate, P. Quinctilius Varus, was a man more accustomed to peace than to war.[59] His activities concentrated on the imposition of rules, the exercise of judicial powers, and the collection of revenues—a practice not hitherto implemented in Germany. Dio Cassius appropriately notes that Varus behaved as if the Germans were subject peoples.[60] They were not—as the rebellion of Arminius demonstrated. The Cherusci lulled Varus into complacency, then lured him into an ambush. In the vicinity of the Teutoburg Forest in September A.D. 9, Varus lost his life and Rome lost three legions—a disaster unparalleled in the Augustan years.[61] The news shocked and dispirited the princeps . Augustus reportedly let his hair and beard grow for months as a sign of mourning, and more than once let fly the celebrated lament, "Varus, give me back my legions!"[62] Those histrionics buttress the common view that Varus' defeat marked the major turning point in Augustus' German policy: the plan to pacify all of Germany to the Elbe was given up, and the empire's borders were withdrawn to the Rhine.[63]
It might be more accurate, however, to point to the continuities than to stress the break. Augustus made no public move to surrender. Quite the contrary. Tiberius returned to take command on the Rhine. Roman forces in the area were rebuilt to a total of eight legions, a far larger army than before. Augustus would not give even a suggestion of retreat. Tiberius restricted himself to cautious raids and demonstrations in A.D. 10 and 11. But the demonstrations themselves were important. In the presentation of Velleius Paterculus, they were dynamic offensive maneuvers and aggressive warfare—and that is doubtless the impression Augustus wished to deliver.[64] And in A.D. 13 Augustus appointed Germanicus to supreme command on the Rhine. Germanicus would lead conspicuous offensive campaigns into the interior of Germany. Tacitus pinpointed the motives with accuracy: war on the Germans derived less from the desire to extend the empire or to achieve tangible gain than to wipe out the disgrace of Varus' defeat. The princeps would not allow that calamity to stain Rome's reputation.[65]
The campaigns of Germanicus in A.D. 15 and 16 follow a long familiar pattern. Germanicus claimed major victories and accomplished very little. Despite—or perhaps in consequence of—that fact, he enjoyed lavish honors. Germanicus celebrated a handsome triumph, and his legates received ornamenta triumphalia .[66] When Tiberius recalled Germanicus in A.D. 16, the young general expressed disappointment and asserted that another season's campaigning would have brought the war to an end.[67] Whatever the plausibility of those claims, they were bound to be made. Nor did Tiberius dispute them. Rome halted offensive operations across the Rhine. But Rome also let it be known that it could have subjugated Germany in a year—had it wished.[68] Germanicus' campaigns exemplify once again the repeated discrepancy between achievement and advertisement.
[44] Dio 54.25.1. See R. Frei-Stolba, "Die römische Schweiz: Ausgewählte staats- und verwaltungsrechtliche Probleme im Frühprinzipat," ANRW 2.5.1 (1976) 355–65.
[45] Livy Per. 139; Dio 54.32.1; ILS 212, II, lines 36–39; D. Timpe, "Zur Geschichte der Rheingrenze zwischen Caesar und Drusus," in E. Lefèvre, ed., Monumentum Chiloniense: Kieler Festschrift für E. Burck (Amsterdam 1975) 142; S. Dyson, "Native Revolt Patterns in the Roman Empire," ANRW 2.3 (1975) 155–56.
[46] Dio 55.1.2–5; Florus 2.30.23–27; Strab. 7.1.3 (c291); Livy Per. 141; Suet. Claud. 1.2.
[47] Dio 55.1.3; cf. Suet. Claud. 1.2. On the tale and its significance, see D. Timpe, "Drusus' Umkehr an der Elbe," RhM 110 (1967) 289–306.
[48] Dio 55.2.1–3; Livy Per. 142; Suet. Claud. 1.3–5; Tac. Ann. 2.7.
[49] Dio 55.6.2–3; Suet. Aug. 21; Tib. 9; Tac. Ann. 2.26, 12.39. On the archaeological evidence, see H. Schönberger, "The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey," JRS 59 (1969) 147–49; Wells (supra n. 35) 161–233.
[50] As, for example, do Wells (supra n. 35) 156–57; Kienast (supra n. 35) 300–301.
[51] Vell. Pat. 2.97.4; Florus 2.30.29–30. Florus' claim (2.30.22) that Augustus sought to make Germany a province in order to honor Julius Caesar is not to be taken seriously.
[52] Dio 56.18.1; cf. Christ (supra n. 42) 189–98.
[53] Tac. Ann. 1.39.1, 1.57.2.
[54] Dio 55.10a. 2–3; Tac. Ann . 4.44. The conjecture on Domitius' purpose is that of R. Syme in CAH X, 365–66. The starting point of his expedition remains in dispute: Syme (supra); D. Timpe, "Zur Geschichte und Uberlieferung der Okkupation Germaniens unter Augustus," Saeculum 18 (1967) 280–84; Wells (supra n. 35) 158–59; Christ (supra n. 42) 181–83.
[55] Vell. Pat. 2.106.1–3, 2.107.3, 2.108.1. Similarly, Aufidius Bassus, in Peter, HRRel II, 96, 3.
[56] Dio 55.28.5; cf. Timpe (supra n. 54) 284–88. Note that after the campaign of A.D. 5 Tiberius evidently returned to winter quarters on the Rhine: Vell. Pat. 2.107.3.
[57] Dio 55.28.6.
[58] Dio 56.18.1–2. On this passage, see the astute remarks of Christ (supra n. 42) 194–98 as against Timpe (supra n. 54) 288–90 and id., Arminius-Studien (Heidelberg 1970) 81–90.
[59] Vell. Pat. 2.117.2.
[60] Dio 56.18.3. Other sources, eager to blame the legate for future calamity, stress his combination of greed and ineptitude: Vell. Pat. 2.117.2–2.118.1; Florus 2.30.31.
[61] Vell. Pat. 2.118.2–2.119.5; Dio 56.18.4–56.22.2; Tac. Ann. 1.57–61; Suet. Aug. 23; Tib. 17. The account of Florus (2.30.32–38) is unreliable. On the site of the battle, see E. Koestermann, "Die Feldzüge des Germanicus 14–16 n.Chr.," Historia 6 (1957) 441–43. On Arminius, see Timpe (1970: supra n. 58) 11–49; S. Dyson, "Native Revolts in the Roman Empire," Historia 20 (1971) 253–58. Tacitus' description of Arminius as liberator Germaniae (Ann. 2.88) does not imply that Rome had previously annexed the land as a province.
[62] Suet. Aug. 23.2; Oros. 6.21.27.
[63] Cf. Florus 2.30.39.
[64] Vell. Pat. 2.120.1–2, 2.121.1; Dio 56.24.6, 56.25.2–3; Suet. Tib. 18. The eight Rhine legions are listed in Tac. Ann. 1.37.
[65] Tac. Ann. 1.3.6; cf. Vell. Pat. 2.123.1. The motive is confirmed by Strab. 7.1.4 (c291–92).
Насчет внешней политики Августа и ее предполагаемого изменения напишу позже.
Aelia
Virgo Maxima
Есть такая статья:
Tiberius and the Political Testament of Augustus Author(s): Josiah Ober Source: Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Vol. 31, No. 3 (3rd Qtr., 1982), pp. 306-328
Я сама еще до конца не решила, как к ней относиться, но аргументация автора по крайней мере заслуживает внимания.
Главная идея автора статьи в том, что политическое завещание Августа, в котором он, среди прочего, рекомендует Тиберию держаться в пределах границ империи и не расширять их, в реальности никогда не существовало.
Суть там в том, что Светоний, самый надежный источник во всем, что касается императорских документов и архивов, подробно перечисляет и описывает все документы, оставшиеся от Августа и зачитанные в сенате после его смерти, но ни словом не упоминает такое политическое завещание, Тацит говорит только об устном совете не расширять пределы империи, а Дион Кассий – о некоем письменном документе. Мнение Одера заключается в том, что в действительности Август ничего такого не советовал. Но Тиберий, намереваясь прекратить экспансионистскую политику Августа, заявил, что Август на смертном одре, лично дал ему такой совет – отсюда эта информация попала к Тациту. Что касается Диона Кассия, то он следовал наиболее враждебной Тиберию и Ливии традиции, согласно которой Тиберий не успел встреться с Августом до его смерти. Поэтому Дион Кассий не имел возможности представить политическое завещание Августа как устный совет Тиберию и превратил его в письменный документ, куда, помимо этого включил еще ряд советов, которые лично ему представлялись уместными и целесообразными (Одер приводит и другие примеры, когда Дион Кассий поступает подобным образом, используя Августа для того, чтобы озвучивать собственные политические взгляды и прожекты).
Одним из аргументов в пользу того, что Август не мог дать преемнику подобного совета, является тот факт, что Август до своих последних дней не прекращал экспансионистскую политику и вовсе не думал удовлетворяться существующими границами. Вот что по этому поводу пишет Одер:
Aside from the political testament, however, the evidence suggests that Augustus did not abandon his dreams of world conquest in A.D. 9. In A.D. 13 Augustus sent his grand-nephew Germanicus, whom Tiberius had been forced to adopt as his son and heir presumptive, to command the eight legions on the Rhine. Velleius Paterculus (II, 123, 1) reports that Germanicus had been sent out by Augustus "reliqua belli patraturum." It seems quite clear that Germanicus was preparing for an attempt to reconquer the Germans east of the Rhine and that his preparations had been approved by Augustus*44*. In A.D. 14 a Roman road was completed in Africa Proconsularis between Capsa and Tacapae, which cut deep into the lands of the barbarian Musulamii, who three years later revolted under Tacfarinas against this new imperialistic thrust.*45* Augustus does not seem to have abandoned his hopes of continued expansion in Germany and Africa. The tenor of Dio's fourth injunction appears patently contrary to Augustus' imperialistic plans in his final years.
44. E. Koestermann, 'Die Feldzuge des Germanicus, 14-16 n. Chr.' Historia VI (1957), 466; and Seager, op. cit. (n. 11), 74, 89, argued that Augustus had sent Germanicus to the Rhine with the aim of reconquering Germany to the Elbe. Once again the political testament is the only evidence standing in the way of this interpretation. Wells, op. cit. (n. 42), 241ff., suggests, for example, that an expansionist attempt by Germanicus ordered by Augustus is "hard to reconcile" with the consilium against expansion. Cf. also D. Timpe, Der Triumph des Germanicus; Antiquitas I. 16 (1968), 33-38. For a full bibliography of Germanicus' campaigns, see Garzetti, op. cit. (n. 15), 572-576, 734f.
45. Milestones for the road were laid in A.D. 14 by the proconsul L. Nonnius Asprenus; CIL VIII, 10018, 10023. On the road, see especially M. Rachet, Rome et les Berberes; Collection Latomus CX (1970), 78ff., who argues convincingly (p. 79) that the decision to build the road was made by Augustus and (p. 83) that it was part of "les dernieres mesures imperialistes d'Auguste," which provoked the revolt of Tacfarinas. Cf. also T. R. S. Broughton, The Romanization of Africa Proconsmlaris (1929), 89ff.; P. Trousset, Recherches sur le Limes Tripolitanus (1974), 146f.; C. Wells, 'The Defense of Carthage,' in New Light on Ancient Carthage (1980), 50.
aeg
Принцепс сената
Скорее всего, и Август не собирался завоёвывать Германию. Римляне отомстили за поражение Вара и на этом успокоились. А дальше предоставили германцам самим разбираться между собой.
Выстроенные в Страсбурге и Виндише сооружения того времени явно имеют оборонительный характер.
А Германик, хотя и получил триумф, но понёс значительные потери.
Выстроенные в Страсбурге и Виндише сооружения того времени явно имеют оборонительный характер.
А Германик, хотя и получил триумф, но понёс значительные потери.
Rzay
Дистрибьютор добра
Где-то в этих числах 2015 лет назад битва в Тевтобургском лесу и имела место:
vikond65.livejournal.com
Как-то раз под Тевтобургом
В Тевтобургском лесу, где трепещут осины, И с дубов-колдунов опадает листва, В полуночном часу немцы римлян косили И при этом напевали странные слова: А нам всё равно! А нам всё равно! Не боимся мы римскую братву! Дела есть у нас, в этот трудный час, Легионы мы косим как траву. Эта эпическая боевая…