Aemilia
Flaminica
На это лучше всего ответил Брант, по поводу количества солдат Помпея.
© Pompey's Army, 66-62 BC, Under the Lex Manilia Pompey received not only the command against Mithridates but the provinces of Bithynia and Cilicia; both Glabrio and Marcius Rex were superseded*4*. He marched into Galatia with his own forces and there took over the troops still under Lucullus' own command, except for 1,600 men who were to follow in Lucullus' triumph; such was the 'whole army of Lucullus' which backed Murena's candidature in 63*5*. It was here that he re-enlisted the Fimbrians*6*. Lucullus had retained the remnants of 8 legions, the survivors of endless marching in hard country and of Triarius' bloody defeat. Of these the 2 Fimbrian legions had been formally disbanded. They must previously have been much below strength, and their mutinous conduct would have made it natural prudence for Pompey to have dispersed them among other units; in 49 we know that he consolidated 2 weak legions into a single legion.7 Pompey had already summoned the soldiers 'everywhere' to join him. It seems likely that Glabrio had some soldiers, even though Cicero describes him vaguely as 'non satis paratum ad tantum bellum administrandum" it would have been good sense if he had been authorized total* out a consular army of 2-3 legions, or at least supplementa} to replace the Fimbrians and to make good war losses, especially those of Triarius. It is no objection that be had hitherto been inactive; he might have had reasonable doubts about his own capacity and about the fighting quality of raw recruits. There is, however, equally no evidence for this conjecture. At a rather later stage Pompey obtained the command of Marcius* 3 legions ;* Marcius had apparently been intervening in Syria.3 Pompey now had at his disposal at least 6 old legions from Lucullus (which may or may not have been reinforced by the dispersal among them of the Fimbrians or by supplementa brought by Glabrio, but which were depleted by the detachment of 1,600 men to escort Lucullus home, as well as by previous losses), 3 formerly under Marcius Rex and an unknown number which he had railed for the pirate war, perhaps also new legion* brought out by Glabrio and perhaps Metellus' 3 legions from Crete (but v, supra). Our authorities no¬where give the total.
It is attested that in 63/3 Pompey left 2 legion* to garrison Syria;4 they were commanded first by a legate, M. Scaurus, and later by governors of praetorian rank, L. Marcius Philippus (61-59) and Cn. Lentulus Marcelli-nus (59-57), till the arrival in Syria of A. Gabinius, consul 58, It can surely he assumed that a similar force was left in Cilicia. The 2 legions which Cicero inherited there in 51 must have constituted the army which the proconsul Lentulus Spinther commanded as early as 56; he earned a triumph in the province. It is true that we do not know of any governor between Pompey and T. Ampius Balbus, Lentulus' predecessor, and that Ampius was only of praetorian rank; but we need not infer from this that before 56 the province was ungarrisoned; in Syria too the governors from 63 to 57 were praetorian, and it is almost by chance that their names are preserved. Legions had been stationed in Cilicia from 78 to the outbreak of the Mithridatic war; it was a frontier province and had been the centre of piracy; and it would have been an act of singular imprudence on Pompey's part to have left it bare of troops. Moreover the fact that Cilicia, not Syria, was originally allocated to Gabinius in itself suggests that in 59, when the senate must have appointed it as a consular province under the Lex Sempronia, it already ranked as a province for which a consular was suitable as governor? Finally the depletion of Cicero's legions (p. 457 n. 7) is best explained if we suppose them to have shared in Pompey's campaigns as well as in the constant guerrilla warfare that was endemic in the Cilician highlands, We may then conclude that Pompey did not bring his whole army back to Italy in 62-61, but left 4 legions in the east.
The size of Pompey's army has been inferred from the donatives he gave to his soldiers. He gave 1,500 denarii to each private soldier ; Appian states and Plutarch hints that officers, as we should expect, received proportionately more. Appian retails a report that the total sum distributed was 16,000 Attic talents = 96 million denarii. Pliny, who does not name this figure, states that 25 million went to his quaestors and legates. On the assumption that he was following the same tradition, that would leave 71 million denarii for junior officers and other ranks. The assumption cannot go unquestioned, since Pliny also says that he paid in 50 million denarii to the treasury, whereas Plutarch gives 20,000 talents=120 million denarii; it is clear that there were discordant estimates at least of this sum,1 But if the assumption be granted, we can try to estimate the number of soldiers who received the donative, What parts of the 71 million denarii went to junior officers? On this there is no agreement. Tigranes had previously distributed 50 denarii apiece to each private in Pompey's army but 1,000 to each centurion and either 6,000 or 10,000 to each tribune. It might be supposed that in fixing these proportions he followed Pompey's advice and therefore that Pompey himself would have adopted the same proportions in granting his own donatives, On this view, if privates received 1,500 denarii tribunes must have received 180,000 or even 300, 000 apiece, and centurions 30,000. It has, however, been argued that Pompey is more likely to have observed the same ratios as Caesar in 46, when centurions got twice and tribunes four times as much as common soldiers; they would then have received respectively 3,000 and 6,000 denarii.
Gelzer (taking 180,000 denarii for tribunes and 30,000 for centurions) finds the sum sufficient for 8 legions of 4,000 men each, The number of 8 legions must cause surprise, Gelzer himself allows that at an earlier stage Pompey probably had 48,000 men. He points out that Pompey left 2 legions in Syria and settled some men at Nicopolis;5 he fails to see that there were certainly also 2 legions in Cilicia. But would the soldiers who remained in service have been deprived of their reward? It is true that Pliny and Plutarch both connect the donative with the triumph, which was deferred till 30 September 61 months after Pompey had disbanded even that part of his army which came back to Italy. But, according to Appian, he distributed his largess while stili in the East; probably it was only recorded on tablets carried at the triumph, and not actually paid then. That surely suggests that no legionaries still under the colours were excluded. But Pompey's army was surely stronger than 8 legions, about 32,000 men.
It is certain that he had brought out at least 2 legions himself and taken over 3 from Marcius. These were all fresh legions whose strength should have been not less than 20,000 men, rather 25,000- He had inherited 6 depleted legions from Lucullus, and it might be held that they were amalgamated into 3. But their numbers should have been somewhat reinforced by the re-engagement of the Fimbrians; and Glabrio had surely come out with supplements, if not with 2 or 3 new legions, Moreover it seems improbable that Pompey's own army before the Lex Manilia took effect consisted of no more than 2 legions. Be was moderate indeed if he levied only some 10,000 legionaries, fewer than Marcius or Metellus Creticus, when he had been authorized to raise perhaps 120,000 men. If we allow him 3 or 4 legions of his own (by way of conjecture), then his own force with that of Marcius amounted to some 30,000, and with that taken over from Lucullus to per¬haps 50,000. Casualties could well have reduced this number to some 40,000 by 62, If we assume that as a result of amalgamations the number of legions was 12 and that all benefited in his donatives in 62, we shall get the most plausible result by supposing that he paid those donatives on the scale later adopted by Caesar, 72 tribunes and 720 centurions would have absorbed 2,592,000 denarii; doubtless Pompey gave something to praefecti and comites and took a handsome share himself. Some 40,000 common soldiers would have required 60 million denarii, which could easily have been found from the balance of 71 million.
I therefore reach the precarious conclusion that Pompey's army in 66 numbered some 50,000 legionaries, probably distributed into 12 legions, that it was reduced by some 10,000 in the course of his campaigns (Lucullus had probably lost well over half his men) and chat he brought 8 legions home, about 30,000 men.
Итого, по выводам Бранта расселить надо было 30 000 человек, а не «минимум миниморум 50 000».
P.S. Отредактировала в связи со своей ошибкой, сначала не совсем верно поняла текст Бранта.
Так, подождите, откуда 100 тысяч? Как я понимаю из хронологии изложения Диона Кассия, сначала сенат отказался с Помпеем обсуждать аграрный вопрос, а уже потом трибун внес это предложение.
Нет, спасибо, напоминать мне о том, кто из оптиматов с помощью хлебного закона пытался реализовать свои планы и нейтрализовать влияние Цезаря, пользуясь резко осуждаемым оптиматами средством, не надо. Я этого человека хорошо знаю и помню.
Я уже давала выше цитату из книги Осгуда, из которой очевидно, что люди землей все-таки пользовались и откуда у Вас такая очевидность, что ¾ земля была нужна не чтобы жить на ней, мне совершенно непонятно.
Так, минутку. Эту землю все же предлагалось именно выкупать. И какие-то деньги за нее хозяевами этой земли были бы получены.
Кроме того, уже в 59 г. Цезарь нашел, как расселить 20 000 граждан на землях Кампании, земля была, просто сенат не хотел, чтобы эту землю кто-то трогал. Раз Цезарь смог найти такую землю в 59 г., то ее можно было поискать и в 62 г. Было бы желание.
Земли, предназначенные для раздачи точно также можно было согласовать, а не упираться рогом в стену и кричать, что это все тирания в чистом виде. Сенат вполне мог взять на себя составление перечня земель для распределения, даже в 59 году Цезарь предложил им – внесите любые поправки. Напомнить, что получали от сената в ответ Помпей в 62 и Цезарь в 59?
Цицерон вот попытался сделать хотя бы это, но оптиматы по словам того же Цицерона противились принятию закона в целом, даже не желая это обсуждать.
Эти люди уже его клиенты. Они уже его ветераны. Они уже преданы ему. Только если не дать им землю, они превратятся в банду, вливающуюся в городской плебс, всегда готовую на любые бунты и насилия. А если дать им землю они станут нормальными собственниками, будут иметь свое хозяйство и сто раз еще подумают, стоит ли им ради очередного бунта терять имеющееся. И Помпею куда легче будет созвать под свои знамена для насилия разрозненную банду нищих плебеев, чем имеющих свой надел и работающих на нем римских граждан. Ну вот провели в 59 закон, землю раздали. Что-то не заметно, чтобы прямо в 59 году ветераны дружно начали кампанию «Помпея – в цари навсегда!».
В 67 г. у Помпея во время принятия закона Габиния еще не было тех ресурсов, которые у него были по возвращении с Востока в 62 г. И имиджа покорителя Востока и победителя пиратов, что влекло за собой огромную популярность, тоже еще не было.
Насчет 59 г. Вы отвечаете на мою фразу о том, что оптиматы не стали бы доводить Помпея до крайности, подав на него в суд. Ну они и в 59 на него в суд не подали, а аграрному закону они противились и в 60-х и в 59, просто в 60-х до беспорядков не дошло, а в 59 уже дошло.
Это уже разговор по кругу, я выше обосновывала, что ничем подобным ни одно из предложений Помпея не являлось. Если Вас не устраивают мои обоснования, давайте разберем их или просто зафиксируем разногласия, повторять нам с Вами общее мнение по ситуации без разбора конкретных обоснований я смысла не вижу, честно говоря.
И в Иудее ему право распоряжаться тоже давали.
Погодите, но ведь Красс получил овацию за то, что это была война с рабами. Не с разбойниками, а с рабами.
Сами пираты - это фактически как горные племена, со своим почти государством, своими вождями и т.д. За победы над племенами всегда давался триумф. Поэтому на этом основании отказ Помпею в триумфе бы не прошел.
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